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Guerra y terrorismo. Guerra al terrorismo. Un
eje semántico del discurso político de EEUU
tras el 11-S
En este trabajo analizamos un caso particular de utilización del lenguaje con fines políticos, concretamente
de persuasión de la opinión pública. Tras los atentados del 11 de septiembre, el discurso oficial de Estados
Unidos ha girado principalmente en torno a un eje semántico formado por los conceptos de guerra y
terrorismo, asociados en una consigna política básica: “Guerra al terror(ismo)”. Analizando algunos
problemas conceptuales relacionados con la definición de guerra, y especialmente de terrorismo,
observamos un solapamiento semántico y abordamos la interacción resultante. A continuación estudiamos
un corpus de textos pertinentes, principalmente del Presidente Bush, para ver cómo ambos conceptos se
articulan en un modelo de discurso. Por último, observamos que la confusión entre estos conceptos puede
utilizarse para conculcar marcos jurídicos establecidos, como los derechos civiles y la rendición de cuentas
pública, y para así poner en práctica un amplio programa de política interior y exterior.
Palabras clave: terrorismo, Estados Unidos, definición, lenguaje político, 11 de septiembre
In this work we analyze a particular instance of how language is used for political ends, namely for
political persuasion. Official discourse in the United States after September 11th has revolved mainly
around a semantic axis built on the concepts of war and terrorism, combined into a major political motto:
“War on terror(ism)”. By analyzing conceptual problems related to the definition of war and, especially,
of terrorism, we find a semantic overlap between the two and we comment on the resulting interplay.
Next, we study a corpus of relevant texts, mainly by President Bush, to show how both concepts are
articulated into a standard speech model. Finally, we conclude that confusion between these concepts can
be used to overlook established legal frameworks like civil rights and public accountability, and thereby to
implement a far-reaching domestic and foreign policy agenda.
Keywords: terrorism, United States, definition, language of politics, September 11th
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War has been waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder. This nation is
peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger. The conflict was begun on the timing and
terms of others. It will end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing.
President BUSH, Washington, D.C. (The National Cathedral), September 14, 2001
Le ressort du gouvernement populaire en révolution est à la fois la vertu et la
terreur: la vertu, sans laquelle la terreur est funeste; la terreur, sans laquelle la vertu
est impuissante. La terreur n’est autre chose que la justice prompte, sévère,
inflexible; elle est donc une émanation de la vertu.
Maximilien ROBESPIERRE, discours prononcé à la Convention le 5 février 1794
1. Introduction
1.1. Political context
The attack on New York’s World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001, brought
shock and horror not only to the United States, but also to the whole world. Human
reaction was a mixture of panic and bewilderment, anger and pain, sorrow and
bereavement. Whether or not September 11th changed the course of history, the events
undoubtedly took their toll on the American psyche.
Political reaction in the victim country was swift. It came in the shape of a number
of administrative and policy measures by President Bush’s administration that have
had a lasting impact, directly or indirectly, into the present moment. Some of these
measures have aroused widespread controversy, both in the United States and
worldwide. Some have been as momentous as two wars. Some have encroached on
civil rights. But, in spite of misgivings and controversy, President Bush’s policies
received a clear popular endorsement at the 2004 election, which gave him a second
term in office.
1.2. Aim and scope of the work
The present work is guided by an interest in language as well as in politics. We try
to look in some detail into a particular instance of how language is used as a tool for
political ends. In this age of communications, the way reality is portrayed in political
discourse can – especially in a democracy – have a strong impact on public opinion,
whose resulting perceptions will cause it either to back or to oppose existing policies.
We intend to analyze certain aspects of official political discourse in the United
States in the aftermath of September 11th. Our aim is to bring to light some major
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recurrent themes and the way they are articulated into a standard speech model.
Namely, we will show that, since that date, official political discourse has revolved
mainly around the interplay of the concepts of war and terrorism. This two terms have,
therefore, come to form a semantic axis articulating, to a large extent, public
statements by President Bush.
1.3. Methodology
Given that our aim in this work is to show some interactions between political
discourse, actual policy and public opinion, our conclusions will be based on an
analysis of relevant texts. We will explore how language in general, and certain terms
in particular, are used to create a particular effect on the audience, both through
denotation and through connotation. We will further show the way in which particular
feelings are made to arise in the audience through the usage of concrete terms or
speech procedures, thereby appealing to subjective emotions rather than trying to
convince through rational, objective argument.
To do this, we have chosen the following corpus of texts:
• a series of public addresses by President Bush in the first moments or days after
the September 11th attacks (for details, see Bibliographic references at the back);
• President Bush’s weekly radio addresses to the nation, from the start of his first
mandate until February 2005;
• both of President Bush’s inaugural addresses (2001 and 2005);
• the yearly State of the Union Address, from 2002 to 2005;
• a very recent (March 2005) speech by President Bush before a military institution
(see Bibliographic references);
• and, finally, an official policy document, the National Security Strategy
(September 2002).
1.4. Semantics and the language of politics. Some basic notions
Political communication is a particular sort of speech situation with a speaker –the
politician– acting as transmitter, and a hearer –public opinion, the citizen– acting as
receiver. Besides prima facie signification, the discourse itself is an encoded message
carrying clues introduced by the speaker in order to convey added meaning. The
receiver must decode these hidden elements of meaning at the same time as the
obvious elements. When the encoding is shrewd enough, the hidden message will get
decoded and understood by the receiver at a subliminal level, it will not get perceived
consciously and therefore will be doubly effective.
The language of politics is often distinguished by the resort to labelling, to slogans
that catch the attention of audiences and direct their thinking. In order to build their
public discourse, politicians tend to select a few simple notions to anchor other
constitutive elements of discourse. These central notions acquire in time a specific
meaning in the relevant discourse, a meaning deriving from their recurrent usage in a
particular context or for a particular purpose. That is to say, they soak up notional
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features from the recurring surrounding context and in this way their meaning goes
through semantic changes. These changes can concern either of two dimensions, or
both: (1) the word’s denotation, that is, its direct, straightforward meaning, the
“dictionary meaning”, which is intrinsic to the word, i.e. the concept the word is
supposed to represent; (2) the word’s connotation, that is, mental associations the word
arouses in the mind of the receiver; they come not from the proper meaning of the
word, but rather from the way in which it is usually employed, including the intent of
the speaker and surrounding concepts from which it absorbs semantic elements just
because of their proximity.
Nearly every speech act can be seen as an attempt by a speaker to portray reality
in a certain way to a hearer; by his act, the speaker tries to influence the hearer, that is
to say, to convince him of the truth of his view of reality; this is known as the
persuasive function of language and is present almost in every communication
situation. Political speech is particularly marked by this feature, in that the speaker –
the politician in this case – has by definition an interest in getting the public’s adhesion
(preferably in the form of a ballot) to his views or to his person. Perhaps this is why
the language of politics is much more prone to manipulation than everyday language.
This is not to imply that all political speech is manipulative, only that by its very nature
the persuasive function of language happens to slip into manipulation more often in
political speech than otherwise.
2. War and terror. An interplay of overlapping concepts
We intend here to explore a particular instance of the use of language in politics by
focusing on two terms that have recently been ubiquitous in the prevailing political
discourse in the United States since September 11th, 2001: war and terrorism. Not only
have these terms been ubiquitous, but they have also been combined into the main
political motto used by the Bush administration before public opinion to express its
intended course of action: “War on terror(ism)”.
We are dealing with two terms that, when considered independently of each other,
refer at first sight to apparently clear and distinct concepts. And yet, the situation
becomes much more complex when they get confronted to each other, either because
they occur simultaneously in the same discourse, or because a particular event has to
be characterized as one or the other and a choice between the two becomes necessary.
Namely, there is a whole area of semantic overlap between the two concepts that
sometimes makes it difficult to know clearly which one should be used. To add to the
confusion, extra-semantic factors come into play as well. The interplay of both
concepts, as we will see, is marked to some extent by subjective elements, like value
judgements, ideology, political interests, etc. At the same time, their combination or
confrontation generates a number of conceptual associations that produce a particular
scheme of speech.
Of the two terms, war is a much older one and its meaning is therefore better set,
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giving rise to fewer hesitations. Terrorism, on the other hand, is much more recent.
Although the term itself goes back only to the late 18th century, terrorism is clearly a
modern phenomenon, exploding only since the 1970s2. Since the turn of the century it
has undergone a marked recrudescence –often with roots in Islamic fundamentalism–
that came to a head with the attack on New York’s Twin Towers.
Precisely because of its recent emergence, the meaning of terrorism is still elusive,
the object of much reflexion and uncertainty. The process of semantic consolidation is
still in motion. For this reason, we will study more closely problems associated with
the definition of terrorism than with that of war. By first elucidating the semantic
contours of both terms, we will try to understand better how they have been used,
either independently or in combined form, in the public pronouncements of the
American leadership.
2.1. War. A traditional concept in evolution
“War: (state created by) the use of armed forces between countries or (civil war)
rival groups in a nation” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English).
In his classic On War, Carl von CLAUSEWITZ suggested a very general definition of
war:
“War is nothing but a duel on a larger scale. Countless duels go to make
up war, but a picture of it as a whole can be formed by imagining a pair of
wrestlers. Each tries through physical force to compel the other to do his
will; his immediate aim is to throw his opponent in order to make him
incapable of further resistance. War is thus an act of force to compel our
enemy to do our will.” [our emphasis] (von CLAUSEWITZ, 1976: 75, § 2)
Since the advent of the nation-state, the idea of war has been associated to concepts
such as sovereign states, regular armies, borders, battles, strategy etc. War was roughly
understood as open armed conflict between states through the agency of regular
armies, usually with major clashes called battles and with the purpose either of
conquering territory, or of acquiring material resources, or otherwise imposing one’s
will on the enemy. These are, in fact, the terms in which von CLAUSEWITZ –implicitly–
operates in his work. The Third Geneva Convention (art. 2), on the other hand, does
not define war other than as a kind of armed conflict. It does talk about conflict
between the Parties (that is, between states), including peaceful occupation, but it also
provides for conflict within a single state.
Aside from particular metaphorical usages we can find in everyday language (for
instance, a “war” between mafia families, or a commercial “war”), war is a notion
usually associated with politics. Hence the well-known sentence by von Clausewitz
“war is the continuation of politics by other means” (von CLAUSEWITZ, 1976: § 24).
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Despite being a relatively stable concept, war (a) does allow for nuancing and
qualification, and (b) is undergoing a radical change. Samuel P. HUNTINGTON (1996:
216) talks of an “intercivilizational quasi war between Islam and the West” (our
emphasis), which he defines in negative terms: (1) “all of Islam has not been fighting
all of the West”, (2) “it has been fought with limited means”, and (3) “while the
violence has been continuing, it has also not been continuous”. So, further criteria for
considering any conflict a war would be the ideas of generalization and intensity (war
is fought by two or more full entities, with full means), and continuity (one of the
oldest principles of war).
Yet, he goes on to admit that “a quasi war is still a war”. And he explains why: “the
deaths and other casualties number well into the thousands, and they occurred in
virtually every year after 1979. Many more Westerners have been killed in this quasi
war than were killed in the “real” war in the Gulf” (HUNTINGTON, 1996: 216). So, one
more element is introduced to configure the concept of war: numbers, or the scale of
conflict as shown in the level of casualties3.
As for the concept’s evolution, war has not escaped the contemporary dynamics of
globalization, especially as regards the vanishing of national borders and of other
reassuring distinctions from previous times. Military expert Martin VAN CREVELD
analyzes this evolution, concluding that it is a process affecting all societies equally:
“As war between states exits through one side of history’s revolving door,
low-intensity conflict among different organizations will enter through the other
[…] Who can point to a society so isolated, so homogeneous, so rich, and so
wallowing in its contentment as to be in principle immune? […] Extensive
conflict of this nature will cause existing distinctions between government,
armed forces, and people to break down. National sovereignties are already
being undermined by organizations that refuse to recognize the state’s
monopoly over armed violence. Armies will be replaced by police-like security
forces on the one hand and bands of ruffians on the other, not that the difference
is always clear even today. National frontiers, that at present constitute perhaps
the greatest single obstacle to combating low-intensity conflict, may be
obliterated or else become meaningless as rival organizations chase each other
across them. As frontiers go, so will territorial states […] As new forms of
armed conflict multiply and spread, they will cause the lines between public
and private, government and people, military and civilian, to become as blurred
as they were before 1648.” (VAN CREVELD, 1991: 224-5)
As a matter of fact, the proliferation of low-intensity conflicts has been an enduring
trend already for decades: “The great majority of wars since 1945 have been Low
Intensity Conflicts. In terms of both casualties suffered and political results achieved,
these wars have been incomparably more important than any others” (VAN CREVELD
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1991: 25).
As we will see next, this conceptual evolution is gradually bringing the idea of war
nearer to that of terrorism, the semantic boundaries between the two fading away more
and more.
2.2. Terror. The search for a definition of terrorism
2.2.1. A plethora of definitions
In March 2005 (from the 8th to the 11th),  exactly one year after the Madrid attacks
on March 11th, 2004, the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security,
organized by the Club of Madrid, took place in the Spanish capital. One of the main
recommendations contained in the resulting Madrid Agenda was the adoption of a
definition of terrorism, specifically “the definition proposed by the United Nations
High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in December 2004”.
The undertaking was by no means new. Attempts by the international community
to reach such a definition go back as far as the 1920s and 1930s, in the context of the
International Conferences for the Unification of Penal Law (LEVITT, quoted in
GOLDER and WILLIAMS, 2004: 270). Such attempts have been often connected with
work on multilateral conventions on terrorism. Already in l937, the League of Nations
first drafted a Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, that never
entered into force. The UN has likewise been drafting conventions against specific
kinds of terrorism for the last forty years (now there are seventeen of them, plus two
draft comprehensive conventions on terrorism, plus eight regional conventions), but
has so far failed to include in them an explicit definition of the term, or to draft a
comprehensive convention on the subject.
Not only international organizations have been trying to agree on a common
definition, but also individual national governments in their national law, as well as
legal and political practitioners and scholars. The resulting amount of different
definitions is, understandably, staggering. As far back as 1988, scholars had counted
as many as 109 different ones (SCHMID and JONGMAN, quoted in GOLDER and
WILLIAMS, 2004: 270). As a matter of fact, even within a single country it appears
difficult to have a single definition:
“In the United States federal system, each state determines what constitutes
an offense under its domestic criminal or penal code. [...] The United States
Congress has not been able to reach a consensus on a working definition of
terrorism. The executive branch has also not developed a coordinated position
on the meaning of the term.” (TIEFENBRUN, 2003: 367)
Nevertheless, even if it would seem that just about everybody is struggling to
produce a definition of terrorism, there is no general consensus on whether such a
definition is really necessary in the first place. Which might be one of the reasons why
the endeavour has to date been in vain.
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2.2.2. Is there really a need for a definition of terrorism?
There are plenty of words of very common usage, which have been tentatively
defined many times, and yet which do not have a universally accepted definition; nor
is the need really felt for one, since they are perfectly understood by speakers in
everyday discourse. Those terms have a core meaning –shared by all speakers, thereby
guaranteeing communication– and fuzzy semantic contours. The same can also be said
of terrorism. Normal speakers in everyday discourse can talk about terrorism and
basically understand each other. Nevertheless, if particular instances of the concept
should be referred to, disagreements and hidden misunderstandings would certainly
come up immediately. Speakers would then discover that, by focusing on individual
cases, a world of nuances appears in which full agreement is almost impossible.
And yet, the situation is different if we leave everyday language and look at legal
teminology. If a particular legal system intends to punish a certain behaviour, then the
behaviour must be unequivocally identified in relation to others. That is to say, each
term should ideally correspond to a single concept, and vice versa. So, the need for a
definition of terrorism could be different in everyday speech and in the realm of legal
terminology.
In recent times, the death toll of single terrorist attacks has experienced a dramatic
increase, and the perpetrators’ boldness has shocked and dismayed world leaders and
public opinions alike. Such tragic instances of terrorism as September 11th, 2001, and
March 11th, 2004, have left our societies with a burning urgency to act to prevent a
recrudescence of terrorist acts.
Thus, there have been pressing calls for legal systems to reform and adapt to the
new situation. On the one hand, it has been argued that terrorist acts can be covered
by existing legal concepts, leaving aside terrorists’ motivations and methods and
focusing instead on the criminal dimension of the act. In this way, when perpetrated in
a situation of peace, terrorism would be prosecuted under existing national and
internationa criminal laws, just as any other crime. When perpetrated in war situations,
it would be considered a war crime and fall under the Geneva Conventions.
This sceptical outlook is shared by some scholars and even by experienced judges
such as Judge Rosalyn HIGGINS of the the International Court of Justice:
“Terrorism is a term without any legal significance. It is merely a convenient
way of alluding to activities, whether of States or of individuals, widely
disapproved of and in which either the methods used are unlawful, or the
targets protected, or both.”(quoted in GOLDER, 2004: 271)4
However, one of the dangers of not having a clear definition is that the term might
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become an arbitrary label to be attached to whatever one dislikes or wants to
stigmatize without being accountable for the actual content of the term used. On the
other hand, this approach seems to get farther and farther away from public
expectations. The current prevalence of terrorism has given rise to a perceived need to
apply heavy punishment to these acts, and therefore to distinguish them clearly from
other crimes:
“Today, it is clearly necessary to develop a coherent legal description of
terrorism. […]‘Terrorism’ is now widely deployed in both political debate and
legal discourse, and is referred to in an array of national and international
legislative (and executive) regimes. […] Today, the legal meaning attributed to
terrorism […] is crucial when establishing (and limiting) the scope of serious
criminal sanctions as well as the capacity of the State to infringe upon accepted
civil liberties, such as the right to privacy. Due to the serious legal, political,
social, cultural and economic consequences of describing someone as a
terrorist, or an action as terrorism, lawyers must seek to describe the concept
with as much precision as possible. One danger is that if terrorism is not so
defined, the powers of the State may extend very far indeed.” (GOLDER and
WILLIAMS, 2004: 271-2)
And, finally, the absence of an internationally-agreed definition means that
terrorism as such is not included in the statutes of existing international courts (ICTY,
ICTR, ICC), thereby preventing them from adjudicating on such acts.
The United Nations is probably the body most committed to coming to a definition
of terrorism. Secretary-General Kofi ANNAN recently made an appeal to this effect in
the context of UN reform:
“…the moral authority of the United Nations and its strength in condemning
terrorism have been hampered by the inability of Member States to agree on a
comprehensive convention that includes a definition.” (ANNAN, 2005)
2.2.3. Why has it been impossible so far to agree on a definition?
Given the unquestionable social concern that recent acts of terrorism have stirred
all over the world, as well as the long-term sustained efforts by the international
community to reach consensus on a common definition of terrorism and on a
comprehensive convention on this issue, its failure on both counts seems extremely
paradoxical.
Scholars have tried to explain this. Steward and Woods, quoting Long, suggest that
“the reason that there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism is that the nature
of terrorism is continually changing”. This is undoubtedly one factor of difficulty, since
terrorism is indeed evolving at great speed and any endeavour to grasp it in a sustainable
fashion must be broad enough to take this evolution into account. Nonetheless, this
reason does not seem enough to account for the present state of affairs.
Much more plausible seems the political dimension other writers have advanced as
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an explanation: “‘What is terrorism?’ is a question of politics as much as law”
(GOLDER and WILLIAMS, 2004: 293). Tiefenbrun expounds on this explanation,
referring to the absence of definition as well as to the lack so far of a comprehensive
convention:
“The absence of a universally-accepted definition of terrorism and the
inapplicability of multilateral anti-terrorism legislation to state-sponsored
terrorism reflect the deeply political nature of the term terrorism and the
absence among nations of commonly shared values about the rule of law, the
legitimacy of goals, and the means to achieve these goals. […] “Due to the
political nature of terrorism, states have not been able to reach an agreement on
a comprehensive convention that would include all types of terrorist acts and
that would be applicable to state-sponsored terrorism. Moreover, since
terrorism has been committed in the past by many state actors during the time
of war or revolution, many states prefer to leave the definition of terrorism as
vague as possible.”” (TIEFENBRUN, 2003: 365 and 388)
One way of escaping the apparent inability to agree on a common definition has
been to apply the specific or inductive approach (arguably less open to political
manipulation), whereby terrorism is defined through the enumeration of particular
acts: “According to this approach, international legal scholars have not attempted to
define terrorism as a general concept per se, but rather have attempted to define (and
proscribe) specific actions such as hijacking, the taking of hostages, and so forth. This
can be contrasted with the general (or deductive) model, whereby the definer attempts
to articulate a general concept of terrorism by reference to certain overarching criteria
(such as, for example, intention or motivation)” (GOLDER, 2004: 273). Both
approaches can sometimes be combined in the same instrument.
There was a first futile attempt at a generic definition by the League of Nations in
1937. But this and later attempts came to nothing. “For the majority of this time […],
international consensus on what constitutes terrorism has been frustrated by the
divergent (and intractable) political positions of some states on questions such as
whether the actions of the States themselves can be characterised as ‘terrorist’, and
whether the violent actions of national liberation movements merit the label”
(GOLDER, 2004: 273). The international community has thereafter been applying
instead the specific approach in the several multilateral conventions adopted on the
subject by the United Nations. These conventions each cover a particular instance of
terrorist behaviour: hijacking of aircraft, taking of hostages, bombings etc. This
method carries the disadvantage, amongst others, that the definition sticks to particular
modes of terrorism and is therefore incapable of adapting to new modalities as they
emerge. It is also unsatisfactory from an intellectual viewpoint. So, fresh attempts are
being made at reaching a generic definition. This approach has been endorsed by the
United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (UNITED
NATIONS, 2004: 52), which puts forward the following text:
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“description of terrorism as ‘any action, in addition to actions already
specified by the existing conventions on aspects of terrorism, the Geneva
Conventions and Security Council resolution 1566 (2004)5, that is intended to
cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the
purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to
compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from
doing any act’”.
In much the same vein has the UN Secretary-General expressed himself at the
Madrid Summit (ANNAN, 2005), explicitly endorsing the Panel’s recommendations,
and such are as well the terms of the UN’s Draft Comprehensive Convention on
International Terrorism.
Given the current international situation, prospects for overcoming political
discrepancies hindering the search for a common definition of terrorism could in
principle be described as slim. And yet, recent moves by the United Nations seem to
point a way forward, overcoming the reluctance of states at the –heavy– price of
letting them “off the hook” (see § 2.2.4).
2.2.4. Wherever and by whoever? Agent
Any generic definition of terrorism would have to cover a series of semantic
constituents (agent, target, purpose, means…), giving each of them a specific value. In
section 2.4.5 we will go briefly into some of them. But let us first look at the one that
seems to have been hindering attempts at a universal definition, namely, the agent.
Terrorism is usually conducted by sub-state groups possessing a whole range of
organizational capacity. Isolated individuals are not frequent perpetrators of terrorist
acts because of the complexity involved in organizing successful operations while
avoiding capture. On the other hand, state terrorism as well as state-sponsored
terrorism are well-known phenomena.
“Terrorism historically is the weapon of the weak” (HUNTINGTO, 1996: 187). The
prevalence of sub-state groups as agents of terrorism is mainly due to their position of
weakness in the balance of power, as seen in terms of material or human resources.
According to the classic Weber’s definition, the monopoly of the legitimate use of
physical force is the defining feature of a state6. It is under this principle that states keep
police forces and armies and are entitled to exert coercion and to wage war. In fact,
when a state conducts or sponsors terrorism it is usually because it finds it convenient
to hide behind anonymity in order to avoid accountability. Otherwise, it would use its
army and be answerable before the attacked party or the international community.
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implicitly included in the definition.
6 “A state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force
within a given territory” (WEBER, M., “Politics as a Vocation”, speech delivered in 1918 [“Politic als
Beruf”, Gesammelte Politische Schriften, München, 1921, pp. 396-450]).
3-14 Valdivieso.qxd  16/06/2007  17:51  PÆgina 257
As we have seen (§ 2.2.3), one of the main single reasons why the international
community has so far failed to reach a consensus definition of terrorism has been fears
by individual states that such a definition might one day backfire and be applied to
them. Interestingly enough, the original concept of terrorism referred precisely to its
state form. At a certain stage of the French Revolution (1793), the Comité de Salut
Public adopted terror as state policy in order to cover executions of alleged traitors
and collaborators, and so fend off royalist subversion and the menace of invasion. This
period, which in fact amounted to a wave of state repression, came to be known as the
Reign of Terror (SCHMID, 2004: 5).
The fact is that relevant multilateral conventions on terrorist acts apply only to
individual actors, not states. And this is precisely the approach that seems to be making
its way in the United Nations as it tries to draft a comprehensive convention on
terrorism. After all, this organization is itself made up of member states. When we
think of the way the United States has extracted itself from any obligations imposed
by the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, we should not be surprised
at moves to relieve states of responsibility concerning the use of force in anything that
could be construed as terrorist behaviour.
Thus, the present situation could be cleared if the emergent United Nations’ official
position was finally endorsed by its members. In a recent report, the UN High-level
Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change made the following case for a convention
that would exclude actions by states:
“Since 1945, an ever stronger set of norms and laws–including the Charter of
the United Nations, the Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute for the
International Criminal Court–has regulated and constrained States’ decisions to
use force and their conduct in war […]. The norms governing the use of force
by non-State actors have not kept pace with those pertaining to States. This is
not so much a legal question as a political one […]. The United Nations must
achieve the same degree of normative strength concerning non-State use of
force as it has concerning State use of force.” (UNITED NATIONS, 2004: 51)
In this way, the UN is drawing a basic distinction that could leave its mark on the
understanding of the concept terrorism in the future: terrorism would be associated to
“non-State actors”, whereas state violence would be considered to be covered by other
legal instruments. As recently as March 2005, Kofi ANNAN explicitly endorsed the
Panel’s recommendations:
“It is time to set aside debates on so-called “State terrorism”. The use of force
by States is already thoroughly regulated under international law. And the right
to resist occupation must be understood in its true meaning. It cannot include
the right to deliberately kill or maim civilians.” (UNITED NATIONS, 2005: 26)
If this approach were to be finally adopted, the resulting situation in international
law could be represented through the following correlations:
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This would certainly be a major step as regards international consensus on a major
contemporary challenge. Whether or not it would contribute to containing the
worldwide spread of terrorism remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that it
would imply for the United Nations to go back on a number of previous
pronouncements unequivocally condemning all instances of terrorism, “wherever and
by whoever committed” (TIEFENBRUN, 2003: 384). Moreover, by excluding states
from the legal scope of terrorism, the former idea of state-terrorism would formally
disappear from international law. This could only be compensated for by a more
stringent enforcement of international legal instruments on the conduct of war.
2.2.5. Definitions of terrorism. Other relevant semantic features.
As we have seen, definitions of terrorism are numerous. We will now review some
other semantic constituents, besides the agent, that make up the concept of terrorism
and should therefore be present in its definition. In this way, some of the challenges
implicit in attempts to define the concept will also come to light.
Susan TIEFENBRUN (2003) reviews a number of definitions contained in national
legal systems as well as in several multilateral conventions7. She suggests a set of
semantic features that should be present in any proper definition of terrorism:
1) The perpetration of violence by whatever means; 
2) The targeting of innocent civilians; 
3) With the intent to cause violence or with wanton disregard for its
consequences; 
4) For the purpose of causing fear, coercing or intimidating an enemy; 
5) In order to achieve some political, military, ethnic, ideological, or religious
goal.” (TIEFENBRUN, 2003: 362)
It seems a good starting point. GOLDER and WILLIAMS suggest a definition of their
own as a common denominator of a number of definitions they study. Tiefenbrun’s
criteria are covered:
“political, religious or ideologically-motivated violence that causes harm to
people or property, intended either to coerce a civilian population or
government, or to instil fear in the population or a certain part of it.” (GOLDER
and WILLIAMS, 2004: 289)
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7. See the Annex for the full text of these and a sample of other relevant definitions.
Modality of use of force Agent Applicable legal instrument
war state UN Charter
Geneva Conventions
Rome Statute
terrorism non-state UN comprehensive convention
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And yet, they warn against a definition that would be too general and would
inadvertently cover acts of mere advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action which
would generally be considered legitimate because they are the expression of certain
fundamental rights:
“However, if a definition is expressed at this level of abstraction […] it would
extend to […] a range of activities not generally considered to be terrorism.
Civil disobedience, public protest and industrial action are among the activities
that could fall within the definition. These types of activities should be
excluded from any definition of terrorism.” (GOLDER and WILLIAMS, 2004: 289)
In this way, the level of generality becomes a pre-semantic requirement for a proper
definition of terrorism, that is to say, the definition has to encompass enough semantic
characteristics for it to be “safe”. Or else, as it is the case sometimes, individual pieces
of legislation would have to exclude explicitly these acts from their scope.
This is because one of the relevant semantic features of the concept, PURPOSE, is
shared by those other legitimate concepts with which it might be confused with
dangerous results. Advocacy, or the search for publicity in order to further a particular
cause, is one of the purposes of terrorism. Another one, implicit in the word itself, is
the arousal of fear or terror, aimed at intimidating either governments or populations.
This is an intermediate objective, the ultimate one being coercing or forcing a
government into taking a particular course of action.
The TARGET that comes up most often in definitions of terrorist acts is “innocent
victims”. This is in itself a very ambiguous concept. It usually means persons not
directly involved in the relevant conflict. But terrorists’ targets are often related
somehow to the conflict, if only in the mind of the perpetrator, because they belong to
one of the parties (a member of the military or the police force, for instance). Besides,
the idea of innocence is too vague, especially if understood as opposed to guilt or
responsibility. Perhaps it would be more to the point to speak about indiscriminate acts
of violence, which can actually be directed against persons with no involvement
whatsoever in the conflict.
MOTIVATION in terrorism is usually related to a cause, be it political, ideological, or
religious. This sets terrorist acts apart from other common law crimes that are
motivated by material gain. Terrorism is, as it were, “disinterested”, and for this reason
individual terrorist acts are often considered legitimate by people more or less
sympathetic to the relevant cause. Hence the already commonplace assertion that “one
man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” (apparently by President Reagan).
Whether or not particular motivations can suffice to justify terrorist violence is an
open debate far exceeding the scope of the present work.8
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8. The United Nations (see quote about “the right to resist occupation” in section 2.2.4) is apparently intending
not to take account of motivation when it comes to its blanket ban on terrorism.
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The MEANS to achieve the purposes of terrorism is violence. This is also a vague
concept the degree of which can make the difference between, for instance, mere
vandalism and terrorism itself. It could be understood in this context as the use of force
to either just intimidate, or to inflict material or personal harm (the latter often being
a means to achieve the former).
Although this is usually disregarded in formal definitions, the number of victims is
in normal perceptions also a distinguishing feature setting appart terrorism from war.
In section 2.1 we have already seen the factor SCALE taken into account. But September
11th was a watershed also in this sense. With close to three thousand dead, it was the
culmination of a steady rise in the death toll from terrorist acts witnessed in the last
decades. We will see in section 2.3 some implications of this evolution.
One striking element in many definitions of terrorism is its qualification as
unlawful, proscribed, criminal, etc. This does not seem technically very sound when
one is trying to define a particular behaviour in order to ban it, since it amounts to
including the ban itself (which is supposed to apply to the concept once defined) in the
definition9. It is one more indication of problems involved in trying to define such an
elusive concept. On closer inspection, LEGITIMACY (as opposed to illegality) is an
essential semantic constituent in common perceptions of terrorism. As a matter of fact,
the United Nations condemns (or is trying to) terrorism, but not necessarily war.
Article 51 of its Charter provides for the right to individual or collective self-defense
if an armed attack occurs against a member10. On the other hand, when acts of violence
are deemed legitimate, they are never called terrorism, but insurgency, self-defence,
resistance to occupation, etc. But then, these forms of violence can very often be
covered, just as any other armed conflict, by the Geneva Conventions. In which case,
violation of the Conventions’ rules would be deemed as a war crime11. Thus, when
TIEFENBRUN (2003: 362) asserts “normally the violence associated with terrorism is
perpetrated without justification or without excuse”, she overlooks the fact that the
perpetrator will always claim to have both a justification and an excuse; it is ultimately
a value judgement, and therefore subjective.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the official custodian of the
Geneva Conventions, has issued some guidelines to facilitate their interpretation. It
uses some of these and other criteria in order to make out war from other situations
that could include terrorism:
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9. One would have to know beforehand whether a particular act is unlawful in order to outlaw it, which seems
a catch-22 situation.
10. The right of self-defence is not only recognized in the case of sovereign states: “The United Nations General
Assembly’s definition contained in its Resolution of l991 has reappeared in several subsequent resolutions.
This definition makes it clear that even though all people have certain rights–the right under racist regimes
or alien domination to self-determination, the right to freedom and independence, and the right to struggle
legitimately to achieve this end–notwithstanding these rights, peoples fighting against colonial domination
may not resort to the acts proscribed in the antiterrorism conventions” (TIEFENBRUN, 2003: 384).
11 Likewise, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court does not mention terrorism, but its definition
of war crime (art. 3) could easily apply to it.
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“One test that the ICRC suggests can help determine whether wartime or
peacetime rules apply is to examine the intensity of hostilities […] In addition
[…], the ICRC suggests considering factors such as the regularity of armed
clashes and the degree to which opposing forces are organized. Whether a
conflict is politically motivated also seems to play an unacknowledged role in
deciding whether it is a “war” or not. Thus organized crime or drug trafficking,
although methodical and bloody, are generally understood to fall under law-
enforcement rules, whereas armed rebellions, once sufficiently organized and
violent, are usually seen as ‘wars’. The problem with these guidelines,
however, is that they were written to address political conflicts rather than
global terrorism. Thus they do not make it clear whether al Qaeda should be
considered an organized criminal operation (which would not trigger the
application of war rules) or a rebellion (which would)”. (ROTH, 2004)
2.3. A blurring distinction
In previous sections we have seen a series of indications about potential areas of
overlap between the concepts of war and terrorism. This overlap is partially the result
of a conceptual evolution affecting particularly the idea of war, whereby it is gradually
losing its former distinguishing semantic features and taking on others that were
traditionally associated with the concept of terrorism.
However, it is also clear that war and terrorism were never fully independent
concepts. In this sense, it is useful to represent this semantic field as a continuum
instead as a dichotomy. SCHMID (2004: 3) calls this continuum the “spectrum of
political action”, representing it as a crescendo in the following stages: conventional
politics–unconventional politics–violent politics–state of war. The second stage,
violent politics, includes terrorism and guerrilla warfare. As a matter of fact, guerrilla
has often been seen as an intermediary stage between terrorism and war, therefore
sharing some semantic features with both. Guerrilla often covers, then, that fuzzy area
of overlap signalling the convergence of the concepts of war and terrorism. Some
authors8 have analyzed this and tried to establish the relevant semantic boundaries.
Crozier pictures a crescendo between these three ideas, mentioning insurrection as a
concrete instance: “Whatever the country or the circumstances, insurrection tends to
follow a sequence of three phases: terrorism, guerrilla warfare and full-scale war”.
However, this historic overlap seems now to be expanding into the semantic areas
that were formerly the exclusive domain of one of them, the three concepts slowly
collapsing into a larger, more vague one. This would go a long way to explain a
number of paradoxes and perplexities arising nowadays from this increasingly
confused area of meaning. Let us mention as an example two distinguishing semantic
features, the agent and the scale, that are losing sharpness:
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12. See SCHMID (2004: 10-12) for a summary of the views of authors like Rapoport, Merari and Crozier.
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“In the future, war will not be waged by armies but by groups whom we today
call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers, but who will undoubtedly hit on
more formal titles to describe themselves.” (VAN CREVELD, 1991: 197)
“In the past, terrorists could do only limited violence, killing a few people here
or destroying a facility there. Massive military forces were required to do massive
violence. At some point, however, a few terrorists will be able to produce massive
violence and massive destruction.” (HUNTINGTON, 1996: 187-8)
And September 11th, with close to three thousand mortal victims, has been a
watershed in this process:
“September 11th, 2001, signalled a new age of terrorism, which also requires
new ways of thinking it and of fighting it. With the disappearance of limits and
borders, the traditional category of crime is also disappearing […]. Hence, the
first debate was about whether we were dealing with a war or a terrorist act.
Simulations of a traditional war (Afghanistan, Iraq) were conducted without
wanting to acknowledge that the enemy is in the home front and that he must
be fought differently […] The attempt to lay responsibility on particular states
reflects a traditional militaristic way of thinking, whereas we might have
entered a situation of “individualisation of war” (BECK, 2002: 34), in which it
is not states which confront each other, but instead individuals […] declare war
on states […] In any case, confrontation is no longer territorial. Ultimately, we
lack an enemy with an assigned status as a political subject […] In the
immediate future we will not be allowed to find consolation in traditional
schemes that used to help combat confusion. We will witness conflicts with no
uniforms, with scattered explosions and sinister methods of destruction,
without signs on maps like those shown by battlefronts, with strategies
designed to cause fear rather than casualties. Martin van Creveld (1991 and
1999) has seen in all this a metamorphosis going beyond the military
dimension: the end of the modern state’s age, of recognizable sovereignty, of
the monopoly of force and of guaranteed security.” (INNERARITY, 2004: 76-8)
And yet, in the midst of this growing confusion, and while acknowledging the
difficulties involved in deciding when to apply war rules, some criteria have been
advanced to that effect:
“The best way to determine if war rules should apply would be through a
three-part test. To invoke war rules, Washington should have to prove, first, that
an organized group is directing repeated acts of violence against the United
States, its citizens, or its interests with sufficient intensity that it can be fairly
recognized as an armed conflict; second, that the suspect is an active member
of an opposing armed force or is an active participant in the violence; and,
third, that law enforcement means are unavailable.” (ROTH, 2004)
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3. A semantic axis articulating political discourse after September 11th
Since September 11th, 2001, the war on terror has been a permanent fixture in the
American public discourse. Hardly a week has gone by without President Bush
making it the main subject, or at least a substantial component, of his weekly radio
address to the nation (the main bulk of the texts analyzed here), whereas, on the other
hand, in the months leading up to the attacks in 2001, only one such address had been
on a related topic–national security9.
The public discourse of the Bush administration has largely conformed to a certain
structural, logical and lexical pattern that was set very early after the attacks. Soon
after his return to Washington on the very day of the tragedy, in an address from the
Oval Office (OO 11.9), President Bush already talked of “the war against terrorism”.
On the day after, in a speech following a Cabinet meeting (CR 12.9) he laid out the
main themes of this discourse which he consolidated and developed, on September
20th, in an address before a joint session of Congress (JSC 20.9).
A remarkable feature of this pattern is its regularity. After a few hesitations at the
beginning, and with very few variations, it amounts to a standard model reccuring
again and again, only to be complemented with different thematic additions according
to the particular juncture. This standard pattern of discourse is configured by a series
of thematic building blocks spinning off from the main axis, war/terror, and could be
outlined as follows:
The United States has been attacked
The United States must respond with determination
This is a formal war
This war is a universal struggle of good against evil
War involves a state of exception calling for flexibility
War requires unity
The United States is not alone in this war
The war will be long. Its objectives are clear
The United States is still threatened
Security is an absolute policy priority
There are historical precedents to this situation.
In the following sections, we will look more closely into the way these building
blocks actually function in the texts, paying particular attention to the two main
articulating concepts, war and terror10. But, before that, let us begin by outlining a
number of general features of President Bush’s discourse11.
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13. On that occasion, interestingly enough, President Bush had stated a concern about terrorist attacks on the
United States, only he failed to anticipate the right kind of threat: “we must make sure our country, itself,
is protected from attack from ballistic missiles and high-tech terrorists” (RA 10.2.2001).
14. In order to avoid an overload of data, in the case of very brief quotations, such as isolated expressions or
words, we will dispense with references. Emphasis is ours in all cases.
15. For the theoretical remarks on political speech we draw mainly on the work by FERNÁNDEZ LAGUNILLA
(1999).
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First of all, we have to bear in mind the audience. Nowadays, political messages
are almost systematically directed to every citizen, even when taking place directly
before more limited audiences, as is the case with the State of the Union Address
(before Congress, in Washington). The omnipresence of the mass media means that,
in any case, the indirect audience –and this, in the language of politics usually means
voters– is always considerably larger. Radio addresses, moreover, are specifically
intended to reach this wider audience. What this means is that the discourse can never
be too technical, too elaborate, in short, too high-brow for the general public.
This leads to a second striking feature, the sheer simplicity of the discourse. As we
will see, this shows in the reiteration of subjects and words, in the extreme simplicity
of arguments, and in a Manichean worldview totally lacking in nuance or
qualification.
Political discourse is by definition not informative or neutral, but rather emotive
and meant to inspire, stir and influence. A third feature is, thus, the use of connotation
over denotation, that is, the reliance on terms that arouse feelings because of their
positive or negative value, instead of terms that communicate conceptual information
in a rational way. The aim is to move, not to convince. This is particularly the case in
the analyzed addresses, intended to instill certain feelings and to rally support in a
critical situation. And this is why they are so subjectively loaded, full of laudatory or
else derogatory terms.
3.1. The attack
“America was attacked.” (SoUA 2002)
The deliberate crashing of planes into the World Trade Center in New York came,
first of all, as a tremendous blow for the American people. In President Bush’s
addresses the attack is described as a national tragedy, a great national loss, great
harm, as an event that changed history: “The terrorist attacks on September the 11th
were a turning point for our nation” (RA 11.9.2004).
There are several reasons for this. First, the number of victims and the savagery of
the act. But even this would not explain by itself the intensity of the resulting feelings.
The shock came also from the realization that the country could be caught by surprise,
that its historic sense of invulnerability – coming from its size and from the continental
nature of its geographical makeup – had been challenged beyond recovery. This idea
can be found very explicitly in President Bush’s addresses:
“Americans have known wars – but for the past 136 years, they have been
wars on foreign soil...” (JSC 20.9)
“Our nation has been put on notice: We’re not immune from attack.” (JSC
20.9)
“America is no longer protected by vast oceans” (SoUA 2002)
“America has gone from a sense of invulnerability to an awareness of peril.”
(SoUA 2003)
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Moreover, the awareness of vulnerability is inversely proportional to the
sophistication of the means employed. On September 11th, havoc was caused just by
“box cutters, mace and 19 airline tickets” (RA 14.2.2004). Old criteria for assessing
risk are no longer valid:
“Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to
endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great
chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single
tank.” (NSS 2002)
3.2. The response
“America will stay focused and determined, and we will prevail.” (RA
28.8.2004)
Although one of the elements of the initial reaction to the attacks was shock and
bewilderment, the attending paralysis was short-lived. The Bush administration
immediately tried to instill into people a sense of urgency that would translate into
swift and confident action. The American people must above all be determined; this
was driven home with great emphasis:
“America is ready; the morale of our military is high; the will of our people
is strong. We are determined, we are steadfast...” (RA 20.4.2002)
“...we can be confident. In a whirlwind of change and hope and peril, our faith
is sure, our resolve is firm, and our union is strong.” (SoUA 2003)
“There will be no flinching in this war on terror, and there will be no retreat
[…] This campaign requires sacrifice, determination and resolve, and we will
see it through.” (RA 23.8.2003)
A determination that should not falter until the end, and this end could be
nothing else than assured victory. In fact, one very frequent appendage to
sentences in President Bush’s speeches is “and we will prevail”. Until this final
victory, he endeavours to warn against what he sees as a premature retreat: “We
can’t stop short. If we stop now […] our sense of security would be false and
temporary” (SoUA 2002).
The resolve Bush demands will show not only in terms of perseverance, but also
in the concrete resources that will go into the response. Here we see signs of a
maximalism which will emerge in the same way when it comes to defining the aims
of the war on terror. Namely, it will not be a cosmetic response: “Our response
involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes” (JSC 20.9), but an all-
out war: “We will direct every resource at our command –every means of diplomacy,
every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial
influence, and every necessary weapon of war– to the disruption and to the defeat of
the global terror network” (JSC 20.9).
3.2.1. Preemption
“We’re staying on the offensive, striking the terrorists abroad so we do not
have to face them here at home.” (RA 18.9.2004)
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A further fundamental aspect of the response that is somehow related to these calls
for resolve and determination, has been the preemptive policy adopted by the United
States administration in response to the attacks. This has been the object of much
controversy and we will comment on it in further detail in part IV.
Even if the concept of preemption seems to hinge on a time dimension, time is not
its only constituent, and this plays a fundamental role as we will see. In the case of the
war on terror, striking the enemy before (time) he hits us implies striking him
wherever (space) he may be. Moreover, since he is in general not within our borders,
we must cross them to pursue him. The interplay of these two dimensions can be seen
in the following quotations. The first group uses preemption in the time sense. The
second one uses it in the space sense. And the third one combines both12:
“We protect our country by […] assessing and anticipating our
vulnerabilities, and acting quickly to address those vulnerabilities and prevent
attacks.” (RA 7.9.2002)
“America will confront gathering dangers early. By showing our resolve
today, we are building a future of peace.” (RA 7.12.2002)
“In Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, our military is confronting the terrorist
enemy so we don’t meet that enemy in our own country.” (RA 29.11.2003)
“...wars are not won on the defensive. The best way to keep America safe
from terrorism is to go after terrorists where they plan and hide. And that work
goes on around the world.” (RA 16.11.2002)
“the best way to prevent future attacks is to go after the enemy.” (RA
30.10.2004)
“We will not wait to see what terrorists or terror states could do with weapons
of mass destruction. We are determined to confront threats wherever they
arise.” (RA 8.3.2003)
3.2.1.1. Legal and strategic justification
The US National Security Strategy (February 2002) provides the rationale for the
principle of foreign intervention based on preemption.
Globalisation means, amongst many other things, the blurring of national borders
as they were previously understood: “Today, the distinction between domestic and
foreign affairs is diminishing. In a globalized world, events beyond America’s borders
have a greater impact inside them” (NSS 2002). And this includes the enemy’s ability
to completely disregard American borders while carrying out the attacks. This gives
the United States implicitly the right to cross these same borders in order to respond.
Foreign intervention is given as a basic strategic option: “The U.S. national security
strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism” (NSS 2002).
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the completion of technical verifications on the existence of weapons of mass destruction.
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Grounds are given for the adoption of this approach. First, the failure of strategies
used in recent times: “It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true
nature of this new threat […] the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive
posture as we have in the past […] We cannot let our enemies strike first” (NSS 2002,
p. 15) and, more specifically, during the Cold War: “In the Cold War […] Deterrence
was an effective defense […] Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against
a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of
innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent
protection is statelessness” (NSS 2002, p. 15).
Second, an international legal basis that would nevertheless have to undergo
adjustment to present circumstances: “For centuries, international law recognized that
nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend
themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars
and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the
existence of an imminent threat – most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies,
and air forces preparing to attack […] We must adapt the concept of imminent threat”
(NSS 2002, p. 15).
And so is the principle of preemption described in practical terms: “defending the
United States […] by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our
borders […] to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such
terrorists” (NSS 2002, p. 6).
The risk of such an approach is, obviously, the United States becoming an
unrestrained global power that sees the world as its theatre of operations. To allay such
fears, the chapter closes with a statement of good intentions that subsequently gave
rise to the recurrent assurances we have seen (see section 3.8) on the part of President
Bush about the aims of foreign intervention: “The purpose of our actions will always
be to eliminate a specific threat […] The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force
measured, and the cause just” (NSS 2002, p. 16).
3.3. A formal war
3.3.1. The attack equals a declaration of war
“The terrorists and their supporters declared war on the United States, and
war is what they got.” (SoUA 2004)
Even a proactive, determined attitude in the response to the attacks would not
necessarily have meant launching a military offensive. Other options were open: a
diplomatic offensive, or alternatively a law enforcement one. Yet, the Bush
administration chose to construe as an act of war what in fact was a terror act.
Sometimes the equation is explicit: “The deliberate and deadly attacks […] were more
than acts of terror. They were acts of war” (CR 12.9). Other times, the state of war is
presented as a fait accompli: “The terrorists have declared war on every free nation
and all our citizens” (RA 23.8.2003), “America is on the offensive against the terrorists
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who started this war” (SoUA 2004).
In order to sustain the argument, the attack on the Twin Towers is openly compared
to a traumatic historical event, the bombing of the United States fleet in Pearl Harbor:
“Twice in six decades, a sudden attack on the United States launched our country into
a global conflict […] The bombing of Pearl Harbor taught America that unopposed
tyranny, even on far-away continents, could draw our country into a struggle for our
own survival” (NDU 2005). Yet, Pearl Harbor was an act of military aggression
perpetrated by a regular army belonging to a sovereign state, against another army
from another sovereign state. By equalling it to an aggression by an undetermined
enemy without a known national allegiance, the semantic boundaries between
terrorism and war become obscured.
3.3.2. The response will be formal war
“As we gather tonight, our nation is at war.” (SoUA 2002)
Normally, states respond to terrorist acts with law enforcement measures, police
prevention or cooperation with states from which threats might be coming (e.g.: Spain
and France on ETA). The United States administration also did this, but not only.
Whilst the attacks on September 11th were treated from the start as an act of war, the
anthrax episodes that took place soon after were considered as terrorist acts. The terms
used to refer to them (crime, guilty, solve, punish) belong to the vocabulary of police
work, not to military terminology: “anyone who would try to infect other people with
anthrax is guilty of an act of terror. We will solve these crimes, and we will punish
those responsible” (RA 3.11.2001).
Nevertheless, the attacks on the Twin Towers are a different matter altogether. In a
couple of instances Bush establishes a parallelism between crime and terrorism as
between two different domains: “Al Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime”
(JSC 20.9); “If these methods are good for hunting criminals, they are even more
important for hunting terrorists” (SoUA 2004).
During the electoral campaign for the 2004 elections, President Bush uses his radio
address to defend his agenda and criticize his opponent, John Kerry. One of the
subjects is precisely the different approach both take to terrorism prevention:
“[Senator Kerry] says the war on terror is “primarily an intelligence and law
enforcement operation” (RA 30.10.2004). Given the aggressive mood of the whole
address, this statement of a divergence of views amounts very clearly to a radical
dismissal of the law enforcement approach. Some time before, at that year’s State of
the Union address, President Bush had tried to give a reasoned explanation of his
views in this respect. It is one of the very rare instances of an attempt to argue his case
in a rational way:
“I know that some people question if America is really in a war at all. They
view terrorism more as a crime, a problem to be solved mainly with law
enforcement and indictments. After the World Trade Center was first attacked
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in 1993, some of the guilty were indicted and tried and convicted, and sent to
prison. But the matter was not settled. […] After the chaos and carnage of
September the 11th, it is not enough to serve our enemies with legal papers. The
terrorists and their supporters declared war on the United States, and war is
what they got.” (SoUA 2004)
But, to be sure, even if the situation is labelled as a war, there are so many open
questions and doubts that he has to acknowledge it is not a war like previous ones:
“Two-and-a-half years ago, on a clear September morning, the enemies of America
brought a new kind of war to our shores” (RA 21.2.2004).
3.3.3. The war on terror
“Our nation is fighting a continuing war on terror.” (RA 6.11.2004)
This expression has come to encapsulate the main theme of the Bush presidency.
It contains the two main concepts that, combined, have served as a basis and a
justification for many policy decisions. For that reason, it has become the
administration’s slogan and has been largely relayed by the media, which has
contributed to its becoming an essential part of the American people’s mental
representations.
Soon after his return to Washington on the very day of the tragedy, President Bush
already talked of “the war against terrorism” in an address from the Oval Office (OO
11.9): “...we stand together to win the war against terrorism” (OO 11.9). It was early
moments after the tragedy and, needless to say, no military operations had been
announced yet. The use of the definite article the with the noun war was not referring
to a concrete reality, but rather to an abstract notion expressed by a methaphor,
meaning countering, fight, struggle (in the same way as it is often said “the fight
against AIDS”)13. The final formulation of the slogan had not yet been set. Likewise,
it still was terrorism and not terror.
Already next day, however, war had started to take on more definite contours as a
literal description of the state of affairs: “...we will not allow this enemy to win the war
by changing our way of life...” (CR 12.9). And so, for some time after the attacks,
some vacillation can be observed in President Bush’s addresses as to the label to attach
to the upcoming operation. Concretely, there is a certain range of different terms that
come to constitute an evolving expression. These terms are not synonyms, but they are
quite closely related. For instance, four days after the attacks the term war was still
absent from the discourse: “we plan a comprehensive assault on terrorism. This will
be a different kind of conflict against a different kind of enemy” (RA 15.9.2001). An
actual war response seemed, moreover, to have been excluded, even if the enemy had
started one; even so, a war vocabulary starts making its way into the discourse:
María Valdivieso Blanco War and terror. War on terror. A semantic axis...
270Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico
2007, 13 247-304
17. As late as 2004, President Bush referred to this possible metaphoric use to deny it, even if by then the literal
sense in which it had been employed had become abundantly clear: “The war on terror is not a figure of
speech” (RA 20.3.2004).
3-14 Valdivieso.qxd  16/06/2007  17:51  PÆgina 270
“This is a conflict without battlefields or beachheads, a conflict with
opponents who believe they are invisible […] Those who make war against the
United States have chosen their own destruction. Victory against terrorism will
not take place in a single battle, but in a series of decisive actions against
terrorist organizations and those who harbor and support them. We are planning
a broad and sustained campaign to secure our country and eradicate the evil of
terrorism.” (RA 15.9.2001)
To be sure, very soon the “battlefields and beachheads” have returned to the
discourse, only they are not denied anymore but, on the contrary, stressed: “our war
on terror will be much broader than the battlefields and beachheads of the past. This
war will be fought wherever terrorists hide, or run, or plan […] Our weapons are
military and diplomatic, financial and legal. And in this struggle […] We did not seek
this conflict...” (RA 29.9.2001). This is probably a watershed text. The tone sounds
decidedly warlike and the military element is openly mentioned.
From now on, even if terms like struggle, campaign, fight or battle do come up
occasionally, the overwhelming majority of references are explicitly to war. All along,
the choice of war as a term as well as a course of action generates the related war
rhetoric and vocabulary, with terms such as conquer, enemy, battle, threats, win, lose,
battlefield etc, scattered over the texts.
As for the other components of the formula, terror alternates very rarely with
terrorism, or even global terrorism. And the nexus is the preposition on, except for a
few occurrences of against: “they will make us proud in the struggle against
terrorism” (RA 29.9.2001); “...as the war against terrorism moves forward” (RA
29.9.2001); “I want to update Americans on our global campaign against terror” (RA
6.10.2001). 
The reason why terror is finally chosen over its doublet terrorism for the formula
war on terror deserves some reflexion. The term terrorism belongs, on account of the
suffix -ism (and its derivative -ist), to the general language of politics. It is therefore
marked by a more neutral tone, as happens with words of the scientific-technical
realm. Terror, on the other hand, is a word from the general vocabulary, free from
political connotations (although it was the originary term for terrorism) and much
more primary; it therefore appeals better to the innermost feelings and perceptions of
common people. It is, therefore, much easier to transform into an emotive keyword,
the semantic content of which becomes much less important than the connotations
(negative in this case) it suggests and the subjective emotions it arouses14.
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In this context, the denotative meaning of the word, its bare semantic meaning, is
sidelined. Thus, in President Bush’s speeches there is no room for traditional
international qualms about the definition of terrorism. The strong emotional load of
the term makes it possible to almost dispense with its proper semantic content. The
general public considers terrorism a self-defined term, therefore President Bush does
not even (or very rarely) try to define or describe terrorism, he only qualifies it with
derogatory adjectives. Let us, however, see the very few cases in which such a
description is outlined. They refer to the anthrax episodes, which were treated
differently from the September 11th attacks; more generally, they also refer to the
exclusion of political alibis as a justification for terrorism:
“anyone who deliberately delivers anthrax is engaged in a crime and an act of
terror, a hateful attempt to harm innocent people and frighten our citizens.”
(RA 20.10.2001)
“We expect nations to oppose all terrorists, not just some of them. No
political cause can justify the deliberate murder of civilians. There is no such
thing as a good terrorist.” (RA 10.11.2001)
“The enemy is terrorism – premeditated, politically motivated violence
perpetrated against innocents […] Such grievances deserve to be, and must be,
addressed within a political process. But no cause justifies terror.” (NSS 2002)
“a murderer is not a martyr; he or she is just a murderer” (RA 20.4.2002).
The structure of the formula war on terror reflects a frequent procedure in the
language of politics, namely the combination of pairs of words carrying an opposite
judgment value (positive/negative). Although it cannot be said that the term war
carries exactly a positive connotation, in the conceptual spectrum of political violence,
war and terrorism occupy opposite positions in terms of the added notion of
legitimacy15. The implications of this polar structure for the semantic axis war/terror
will become clear in section 2.4. Let us just mention here that each of the two poles is
identified with one of both opposed camps: we make war against them, the terrorists.
Of course, this distinction is not sustainable. If war is legitimate but terrorism is not,
by qualifying as war the response to September 11th the quality of legitimacy gets
automatically transferred to the other side as well. This, in fact, raised some criticism:
“Calling this a war suggests that these terrorists are warriors”16.
The resulting slogan, war on terror, conveniently simple and compact, appears in
nearly every address by President Bush. On each occasion, nevertheless, it is not
overwhelmingly frequent. We usually see it once in every speech, sometimes twice
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and very rarely three times: “As they continue to fight the war on terror in lands far
from home...” (RA 14.6.2003); “Tomorrow the world will witness […] a crucial
advance in the war on terror” (RA 29.1.2005).
In this relative proliferation, war on terror functions as any other political slogan.
As in the language of advertising, what matters more with political slogans is not so
much their content as their reiteration in speech. The intended message is hammered
home through repetition. What is more, this sheer repetition confers on the discourse
a particular feel going beyond pure semantics. In the case of war on terror, and more
specifically of the word terror, it is clearly the creation of an atmosphere of fear and
uncertainty, the very same thing the war on terror is supposed to fight.
The slogan is, according to CASALS (2002) terminology, an objectivizing appellation
or conceptual object. These are logical constructs without any real existence. They are
created “in order to lend strength to an expressed opinion”, “to serve a power or
ideology” (CASALS, 2002: 138-9). “With this appeal, any explanations become
unnecessary, since it creates an object. […] it is the old method of bringing something
into being just by naming it […] They are always very striking, inciting the receiver of
the message to instant adhesion […] They function as ideological labels” (CASALS,
2002: 139). Thus, with the expression war on terror, President Bush gives birth to a
reality that becomes a fait accompli, aimed at achieving an uncritical closing of ranks
behind his policies. Because the main function of conceptual objects is “avoiding
reflective thought and, above all, questions” (CASALS, 2002: 140).
3.4. The two camps: we/they
It is probably the case that any war situation involves a rhetoric of polarization. The
enemy is represented as intrinsically bad and one’s own camp as victims or heroes, or
both. In the case of the United States’ foreign policy in the wake of September 11th,
this rhetoric has reached an unprecedented virulence, if only because of the extremely
simplistic reasoning underlying it.
Creating an adversary and, at the same time, an ally is acknowledged as one of the
distinguishing features of political speech. It has been said that, when there is no
adversary, one has to be made up. Now, whether finding an adversary was a
precondition for the setting of a war situation, or whether war was the opportunity to
find an opponent, would be an interesting point of debate. In part IV we will try to go
a bit further into this. For now, let us analyze this conceptual dichotomy as we find it
in the texts.
3.4.1. Good versus evil
“Three years ago, the struggle of good against evil was compressed into a
single morning.” (RA 11.9.2004)
The way the stakes in this war are presented could not be more radical: the two
forces at play are none less than good and evil. This, as so many messages in President
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Bush’s addresses, is conveyed in strikingly explicit terms: “This will be a monumental
struggle of good versus evil, but good will prevail” (CR 12.9). In this Manichean
scenario, of course, each opponent is not the abstract entities good and evil, but their
embodiment. And here starts the characterization of both camps, as we is always
associated with good: “This nation is confronting a terrible evil, and we are
overcoming evil with good” (RA 6.7.2002); “our country has shown the strength of its
character by responding to acts of evil with acts of good” (RA 31.8.2002). This
translates into more concrete character features: “The contrast could not be greater
between the honorable conduct of our liberating force and the criminal acts of the
enemy” (RA 29.3.2003).
There is a parallel, similar opposition between two principles that could be seen as
the political manifestation of the forces of good and evil: freedom and fear: “Freedom
and fear are at war” (JSC 20.9); “the forces of terror cannot stop the momentum of
freedom” (SoUA 2002). It is in the shape of this opposition that President Bush refers
to God as taking the United States side in this war. Even if he often mentions God
towards the end of his speeches, he usually does so in the form of a plea for divine
support. In the present case, though, he takes for granted such support: “Freedom and
fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral
between them” (JSC 20.9). This is redolent of the rhetoric of the Crusades, although
post-9/11 public discourse in the United States has largelly refrained from referring
explicitly to holy wars and crusades.
3.4.2. Taking sides
“Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are
with us, or you are with the terrorists.” (JSC 20.9)
The adopted Manichean approach means that everything is seen as good or evil,
black or white, excluding shades of grey. Thus, the cleavage between the two camps
applies to everybody, all other possible nuances being radically excluded17: “In the
struggle between terrorist killers and peaceful nations, there is no neutral ground” (RA
27.9.2003). Which means that every nation has to take one or the other side. And
injunctions to do that come even with threats attached: “The United States is
presenting a clear choice to every nation: Stand with the civilized world, or stand with
the terrorists. And for those nations that stand with the terrorists, there will be a heavy
price” (RA 6.10.2001).
3.4.3. We
“By our actions in this war, we serve a great and just cause.” (RA 5.4.2003)
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President Bush plays his role –as elected leader of the nation and Commander in
Chief of its armed forces– in trying to instill into the citizens a sense of community in
times of war. We will develop this further in section 3.6, but let us look for now at the
way language procedures are used to construct this we as one of the poles in the
dichotomy.
Firstly, there is a continuous use of plural or collective nouns representing the
social and institutional community that underlies the United States, thereby
highlighting the belonging to a politically organized society, sometimes with the
attached national adjective: citizens, our people, the American people, Americans,
fellow Americans... Also very frequently, the idea of political community is given
through nouns denoting the potitical entity itself: America, the United States, this
country, the nation... These terms are often reinforced by the use of possessive
adjectives in the first person: our country, our nation, our Union, my fellow citizens,
my fellow Americans...; some other times, the collective noun is associated with
positive qualities, in the same laudatory vein we have seen in section 3.4.1: a great
people, a great nation, this good nation...
Secondly, a morphological procedure, the use of pronouns in the first person plural,
with the same meaning of a sense of community: we, our, us. This is one more
procedure typical of the language of politics. The speaker seeks thereby to identify
himself with the audience as members of a politically organized group. The referent
of this pronouns varies, from the United States government (to which the President
belongs) to the community of the American people (to which he belongs as well). By
using we, Bush can play with different belongings and groupings according to the
situation, always showing public, not personal, concern.
The first person singular is also used sometimes. Namely, in two different
circumstances. One is when President Bush wants to present himself in his personal
capacity as the nation’s leader: “I ask the American people to join me...” (BAFB 11.9).
The second is when he wants to distance himself from the actions of Congress because
they are not in accordance with his own views: “I was disappointed by the failure of
the Senate to act on my proposals […] I outlined these proposals in October […] My
ideas passed the House of Representatives […] But the Senate would not schedule
them for a vote “ (RA 29.12.2001).
In the radical dichotomy of good against evil, we have seen that good is equated
with us, on the one hand, and with the idea of freedom on the other hand. Logically,
therefore, the association between we and freedom is also bound to occur. The United
States is presented as a definitional equivalent of freedom or liberty, through a relation
of identification: “Freedom itself was attacked this morning” (BAFB 11.9), “In this
land of liberty […].[…] freedom has had a home and a defender” (RA 6.7.2002).
The quintessential association between we and good, finally, has another set of
expressions that implicitly serve to justify the war by reference to the traditional idea
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of just war. As we can see, justice is considered by national doctrine (the National
Security Strategy) as a pre-requisite to launch a preemptive war: “The reasons for our
actions will be clear […], and the cause just” (NSS 2002, p. 16). Therefore, going into
war presuposes the justness of the cause: “We’ll meet violence with patient justice –
assured of the rightness of our cause” (JSC 20.9).
As a matter of fact, this approach could be meant to fit into classical just war
theory, developed amongst others by Aquinas. The requirements of a just war would
be: “that hostilities be used in support of a just cause, that support of that just cause in
fact be the reason for going to war, and that the war be waged under the legitimate
authority of the state” (Summa Theologica, quoted in LOWE, 2003: 47). But then, “the
tradition […] usually includes three further conditions […]: that war not be started
except as a last resort, that war not be started except when there is a reasonable
probability that it will accomplish its goal, and that the good gained by engaging in
warfare is proportional to the likely pain, suffering and evils that result from doing so”
(LOWE, 2003: 47). This is precisely an encapsulation of the main criticism the Iraq war
has received.
3.4.4. They
“For as long as whole regions of the world simmer in resentment and tyranny
[…] violence will gather, and multiply in destructive power […] and raise a
mortal threat.” (IA 2005)
Not surprisingly, the enemy (they) is presented in a totally negative light, associated
with derogatory terms: a faceless coward, deadly, evil18, despicable, murderers,
dictators, brutalizers, repressors, traitors to their own faith, killers, radical, hateful,
follow in the path of fascism, Nazism, and totalitarianism, dangerous killers,
murderers, ticking time bombs, parasites, tyranny, death, cruelty, thug...
The enemy not only epitomizes all that is bad, but is sometimes presented under
animal-like features; he hides in caves and mountains, and has to be hunted down:
“American people need to know we’re facing a different enemy than we have ever
faced. This enemy hides in shadows and has no regard for human life. This is an
enemy who preys on innocent and unsuspecting people, then runs for cover […] that
tries to hide... .” (CR 12.9).
Here also, the concept of freedom is opposed to the malignant enemy forces:
“There is only one force of history that can […] expose the pretensions of tyrants […]
and that is the force of human freedom” (IA 2005).
3.5. A state of exception
“The federal government and all our agencies are conducting business, but it
is not business as usual.” (CR 12.11)
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The extraordinary circumstances arising from a state of war are bound to have an
impact in the life of a country. The war on terror was in this sense no exception, far
from it. We will see in part IV to what extent this has been a major fact in the conduct
of public affairs in the United States. Here we will see how this is reflected in the texts.
Right after the attacks, President Bush showed a commendable concern with the
preservation of the American way of life in the face of terrorist action: “...we will not
allow this enemy to win the war by changing our way of life or restricting our
freedoms” (CR 12.9). The aim was then “...to find those responsible and to bring them
to justice” (OO 11.9). Yet, very soon afterwards the difficulties involved in pursuing
the perpetrators must have come home to the Bush administration, who already started
announcing the sidelining of those principles: “Whether we bring our enemies to
justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done” (JSC 20.9).
Of course, it would not be the same kind of justice. Here starts, in fact, a series of
references to the way suspected terrorists will be treated. Bringing them to justice is
still a possibility that gets mentioned occasionally: “we will […] bring terrorists to
justice” (SoUA 2002); “We will continue this war on terror until all the killers are
brought to justice” (RA 23.8.2003). But most of the time we see terms and expressions
far removed from the vocabulary of constitutional principles: “we have struck back
against terror worldwide, capturing and killing terrorists” (RA 13.9.2003); “we have
captured or killed terrorists across the Earth” (RA 22.1.2005).
The way treatment of suspected terrorists is presented has sometimes a striking
feature, namely the use of a language redolent of dubious Far West humour:
“...more than 3,000 suspected terrorists have been arrested in many countries.
Many others have met a different fate. Let’s put it this way – they are no longer
a problem to the United States...” (SoUA 2003); “We have captured and
interrogated thousands of terrorists, while others have met their fate in caves
and mountains in Afghanistan” (RA 16.11.2002).
Restrictions imposed by law are seen as obstacles in the conduct of war and
therefore they are referred to in dismissive terms: “The Senate bill would force the
new department to fight against terror threats with one hand tied behind its back. The
department of homeland security must be able […] to respond to threats immediately,
without being forced to comply with a thick book of bureaucratic rules. Yet the current
Senate approach keeps in place a cumbersome process...” (RA 21.9.2002).
As opposed to these unwelcome restrictions, there are calls for flexibility and the
provision of law enforcement agencies with all necessary resources: “the House of
Representatives passed a good bill […] that gives me the flexibility to confront
emerging threats quickly and effectively” (RA 21.9.2002); “we must continue to give
our homeland security and law enforcement personnel every tool they need to defend
us “ (SoUA 2004).
The need for extraordinary resources is justified by reference to the extraordinary
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lengths to which the administration must go in these exceptional circumstances:
“Whatever action is required, whenever action is necessary, I will defend the freedom
and security of the American people” (SoUA 2003); “We will do everything in our
power to make sure that that day never comes” (SoUA 2003).
Not only the nation is at war, but it is a war of a different kind: “...a new kind of
war. They applied new tactics and new technology to rout a new kind of enemy” (RA
29.12.2001). And this newness requires also a change of behaviour: “we are taking
unprecedented steps to defend the homeland” (RA 24.7.2004); “In the three and a half
years since September the 11th, 2001, we have taken unprecedented actions to protect
Americans” (SoUA 2005).
The state of exception is at times set forth explicitly: “We are operating on
heightened security alert” (CR 12.11). And even as something that is there to stay, that
will come to be a fixture of national life: “The last time I spoke here, I expressed the
hope that life would return to normal. In some ways, it has. In others, it never will”
(SoUA 2002).
Naturally, there are constant assurances about the concern to uphold constitutional
principles and civil liberties: “Our government’s first duty is to protect the American
people. The Patriot Act fulfills that duty in a way that is fully consistent with
constitutional protections” (RA 17.4.2004); “we’re strengthening our defenses against
terrorist attack, while upholding our constitutional liberties” (RA 29.12.2001). And
yet, as late as 2004 a need seems to have been felt (probably as a result of social
pressure) to oversee the enforcement of such principles and liberties: “To continue to
protect the freedoms and privacy of our citizens, I’ve established a civil liberties board
to monitor information-sharing practices” (RA 28.8.2004).
3.6. The need for unity. Undeclared patriotism
“This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve
for justice and peace.” (OO 11.9)
The sense of community we have seen implicitly expressed in section 3.4 becomes
also explicit in many occasions. It is an expression of the need for cooperation and
solidarity arising in any common enterprise, but also of the loyalty required more
specifically in times of war. To the extent that there exists two camps, calls for inner
cohesion within each of them will inevitably be made. These rallying cries cover two
dimensions: the domestic one that we will next look into, and the international one,
that will be the object of section 3.7.
Within the United States, two different types of audience are called to unite. First,
individual citizens. This produces one of the most recurrent and elaborate themes in
Bush’s speeches: “America is the most diverse nation on earth. Yet, in a moment we
discovered again that we are a single people, we share the same allegiance, we live
under the same flag – and when you strike one American, you strike us all […] a true
united country. We’ve been united in our grief and we are united in our resolve” (RA
María Valdivieso Blanco War and terror. War on terror. A semantic axis...
278Estudios sobre el Mensaje Periodístico
2007, 13 247-304
3-14 Valdivieso.qxd  16/06/2007  17:51  PÆgina 278
6.7.2002); “We have one country, one constitution, and one future that binds us. And
when we come together and work together, there is no limit to the greatness of
America” (RA 6.11.2004).
The second group are the elected representatives of the people. Since many policy
measures have to be formally approved by Congress, its allegiance becomes
fundamental. President Bush often reminds them of the need for bipartisanship: “I
want to thank the members of Congress for their unity and support. America is united”
(CR 12.9); “Our country and our Congress are now united in purpose. America is
speaking with one voice” (RA 12.10.2002); “we must act, first and foremost, not as
Republicans, not as Democrats, but as Americans” (SoUA 2002).
Perhaps one of the most striking aspects in President Bush’s addresses is the nearly
total absence of explicit references to patriotism. These are replaced with the
omnipresent mentions of America’s grandeur and of the need for unity. And we should
not forget that the main piece of legislation adopted (on 25.10.2001) in response to the
attacks bears, precisely, the name “USA PATRIOT Act”, an acronym for the contorted
title Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act.
As a matter of fact, probably the only occurrence of the term patriotism in the
analyzed texts is by no means a trivial one: “American patriotism is still a living faith”
(RA 6.7.2002). That is to say, patriotism might not be very open, but it is actually seen
as a religion, the ultimate focus of loyalty and a shield against dissent.
3.7. America and the world
“America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and
security in the world, and we stand together...” (OO 11.9)
“America is leading the world in a titanic struggle against terror.” (RA
8.6.2002)
The need for unity has also an international dimension. The United States’
unilateral actions in the war on terror, overstepping the United Nations’ mandate, gave
rise to worldwide controversy. In his addresses, President Bush tries again and again
to allay these concerns and give the impression that the whole operation is not a whim
of his country, but rather a task for the international community. This idea is
encapsulated in very frequent expressions like America, along with its coalition
partners; the United States and our allies; our country and our friends; America and
the international community; America and the civilized world...
The starting point for this argument is the cleavage between the two sides in the
war on terror. The attacks are portrayed to have been aimed not only at the United
States, but at the whole world: “This enemy attacked not just our people but all
freedom-loving people everywhere in the world” (CR 12.9). Or, at least, the civilized
part of it: “This is not […] just America’s fight […] This is the world’s fight. This is
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civilization’s fight” (JSC 20.9); “the civilized world faces unprecedented dangers”
(SoUA 2002). The proof is that in the Twin Towers many nationals of all over the
world died along with Americans: “Nor will we forget the citizens of 80 other nations
who died with our own: dozens of Pakistanis; more than 130 Israelis...” (JSC 20.9).
Therefore, the United States expects other nations to support it in the war on terror,
by forming a coalition of the willing: “We ask every nation to join us” (JSC 20.9);
“Today, the United States is joined by more than 90 nations in a global coalition
against terrorism” (RA 23.11.2002).
America is not only on the same side as the civilized world, it is leading it. This is
made patent, interestingly, already in the 2001 inauguration ceremony, long before the
attacks: “Some seem to believe that our politics can afford to be petty because, in a
time of peace, the stakes of our debates appear small. But the stakes for America are
never small. If our country does not lead the cause of freedom, it will not be led […]
We must live up to the calling we share” (IA 2001). Thus, in statements bordering on
the patronizing, the United States is presented as the world leader and the world itself,
as dependent on it: “The world depends on America’s strength and purpose” (RA
25.1.2003); “Without America’s active involvement in the world, the ambitions of
tyrants would go unopposed, and millions would live at the mercy of terrorists. With
America’s active involvement in the world, tyrants have learned to fear, and terrorists
are on the run” (RA 5.7.2003).
Since the United States’ leading role in the civilized world does not arise from a
concrete mandate, is has to be presented as an undefined calling: “History has called
America and our allies to action, and it is both our responsibility and our privilege to
fight freedom’s fight” (SoUA 2002); “we must also remember our calling as a blessed
country is to make this world better” (SoUA 2003). This is a term that is often used
with a transcendental meaning, as synonymous with vocation. Again, we are slowly
entering the semantic field of religion, as we saw in the previous section. In this case,
the United States is assigned almost a prophetic role attached to a particular kind of
faith: “America came into the world with a message for mankind, that all are created
equal and all are meant to be free. There is no American race, there’s only an American
creed” (RA 6.7.2002).
The coalition of the willing, nonetheless, does not group equal members. The leader
intends to keep its independence of decision. This is plain in stated doctrine: “While the
United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community,
we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense”
(NSS 2002); “In exercising our leadership, we will respect the values, judgment, and
interests of our friends and partners. Still, we will be prepared to act apart when our
interests and unique responsibilities require” (NSS 2002), as well as in concrete public
statements: “There is a difference, however, between leading a coalition of many
nations, and submitting to the objections of a few. America will never seek a permission
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slip to defend the security of our country” (SoUA 2004) (the permission slip meaning,
obviously, a United Nations resolution authorizing the use of force). This is, perhaps,
what is meant by “a distinctly American internationalism” (NSS 2002).
3.8. Duration and aims
“I ask for your patience […] in what will be a long struggle.” (JSC 20.9)
One of the aspects which provoked the most criticism on the war on terror has been
the lack of clear goals and of a set timetable. From the beginning, statements by the
Bush administration have put across, first of all, the uncertainty surrounding the
duration of the conflict: “The war against terrorists of global reach is a global
enterprise of uncertain duration” (NSS 2002); “Whatever the duration of this struggle,
and whatever the difficulties...” (SoUA 2003); and, second, a warning about the likely
length of the operation: “The threat of terror will be with us for years to come, and we
remain resolved to see this conflict through to its end” (RA 16.11.2002); “Americans
should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever
seen” (JSC 20.9).
After a while, in order to counter such concerns, some addresses started carrying a
false impression of precision: “We will remain in Iraq as long as necessary, and not a
day more” (RA 1.3.2003); “Our forces will be coming home as soon as their work is
done” (RA 22.3.2003). But this, obviously, was not adding any more relevant
information.
As for the aims, both generally of the war on terror, and specifically of the war in
Iraq, the same dynamics can be observed. Sometimes, whatever aims are set forth,
they are extremely vague: “We are planning a broad and sustained campaign to secure
our country and eradicate the evil of terrorism” (RA 15.9.2001); “we will carry on the
campaign against global terror until we achieve our goal: The peace that comes from
victory” (RA 26.1.2002). On other occasions, the purported aims come across as
downright excessive, and this amounts to the same, since a goal that is unattainable by
definition cannot be considered in a serious manner: “...with the ultimate goal of
ending tyranny in our world” (NDU 2005); “we will answer every danger and every
enemy that threatens the American people” (SoUA 2003).
In a further attempt to give an impression of clarity of views, the addresses contain
some formal claims about clear strategy. These claims come always in a rigorous
structure, with an appearance of logical order:
“Our nation will continue […] in the pursuit of two great objectives. First, we
will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to
justice. And, second, we must prevent the terrorists […] from threatening the
United States and the world” (SoUA 2002); “The goal of our coalition is to help
the Iraqi people build a stable, just and prosperous country […]. To reach that
goal, we are following a clear strategy. First, […] Secondly, […] And third, ...”
(RA 11.10.2003).
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3.9. The omnipresence of danger
“We’re a nation in danger.” (RA 7.8.2004)
The overwhelming shock that came over the United States on September 11th
caused at first a state of sheer panic. With the passage of time, this feeling settled into
a more subdued, but also more insidious one of fear. This, of course, was one of the
objectives of the terrorists in the first place. For a while, warnings about present
dangers were understandable: “...we must remain keenly aware of the threats to our
country” (CR 12.11); “the enemy is still at large, threatening our safety and security”
(RA 21.9.2002).
But very soon these warnings were being projected into a very long term, as a
fixture of the future American way of life: “The threat of terror will be with us for
years to come […]” (RA 16.11.2002); “...protect our citizens and strengthen our nation
against the ongoing threat of another attack. Time and distance from the events of
September the 11th will not make us safer unless we act on its lessons “ (SoUA 2002).
The dangers are presented not only as permanent, but also as growing with time: “The
danger to our country is grave and it is growing […] The dangers we face will only
worsen from month to month and year to year...” (RA 28.9.2002).
And the only alternative to this future of permanent terror and fear is a strong and
determined reaction; namely: “The only alternative to victory is a future of terror”
(RA 10.11.2001); “...it is natural to wonder if America’s future is one of fear. Some
speak of an age of terror. I know there are struggles ahead and dangers to face […]
As long as the United States of America is determined and strong, this will not be an
age of terror; this will be an age of liberty, here and across the world” (JSC 20.9).
Moreover, years after the attacks the rhetoric of fear does not seem to have
subsided. As late as february 2005, President Bush was still declaring in the State of
the Union Address: “Our country is still the target of terrorists” (SoUA 2005).
The result of all these warnings is the emergence of a climate of fear permeating
the whole society’s everyday life. It is a culture of constant vigilance, suspicion and
apprehension, on the part of both the government: “Analysts will be responsible for
imagining the worst, and planning to counter it” (RA 8.6.2002); “Center personnel
will also prepare the daily terrorism threat report…” (RA 28.8.2004), and the citizens:
“Raising the threat level also informs the general public to be more alert to their
surroundings and prepared for possible emergencies in the event of an attack” (RA
15.2.2003); “Our country is grateful to all our fellow citizens who watch for the
enemy, and answer the alarms, and guard America by their vigilance” (RA 11.9.2004).
3.10. The paramountcy of security
“Our first priority must always be the security of our nation.” (SoUA 2002)
The logical reaction to a climate of insecurity is placing security at the center of
policy: “...our national security. This is the most basic commitment of America’s
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government, and the greatest responsibility of an American President” (RA
10.2.2001); “Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental
commitment of the Federal Government” (NSS 2002). This will necessarily demand
policies whose comprehensiveness and funding are proportionate to the magnitude of
the threat: “America will do what is necessary to ensure our nation’s security” (SoUA
2002); “Whatever it costs to defend our country, we will pay” (SoUA 2002).
And finally, the concern with safety makes its way into even the most prosaic social
formulae: “Laura and I wish every American a happy and safe Thanksgiving
weekend” (RA 27.11.2004).
3.10.1. The three kinds of security
“We need to win the war, we need to protect our homeland, and we must
strengthen our economy.” (RA 13.7.2002)
So, security is presented as the main priority of the Bush administration. When it
comes as an unqualified concept, security means most frequently national security,
that is, the protection of the country as a whole, mainly from threats coming from
beyond its borders. In this sense, it is closely associated to the concept of defense,
meaning in turn protection through military means. Unqualified security can also, less
frequently, mean homeland security, or the protection of citizens, within the country,
from threats that at least have materialized inside the national territory. The related
policy fields are, in this case, civil protection and law enforcement.
In his addresses, President Bush refers to security not only in these two senses, but
also in the economic one, meaning economic growth and employment creation. Very
often he presents the three kinds of security as associated goals of his administration:
“Once we have funded our national security and our homeland security, the final great
priority of my budget is economic security” (SoUA 2002); “as we act to win the war,
protect our people, and create jobs in America...” (SoUA 2002). The range of security
modalities is sometimes expanded even further: “economic security […] health
security […] retirement security” (SoUA 2002).
When these three varieties of security come up together in discourse, they are just
juxtaposed, without any sort of explicit logical nexus between them. It is not said
whether they are conflicting or mutually reinforcing goals. We do get the impression,
though, that they are politically complementary. However, from such a frequent
juxtaposition an indefinite feeling emerges sometimes that, as a matter of fact, a certain
causal relation exists between them, if only because of the association of ideas created
by the juxtaposition in the mind of the receiver of the message. It is as if the pursuit of
war was in some way conducive also to economic recovery: “who will lead our country
during a time of war and economic opportunity” (RA 30.10.2004); “We’ll prevail in the
war, and we will defeat this recession” (SoUA 2002); “I will sign several important
new laws to help secure the homeland and create jobs” (RA 23.11.2002); “In 2003 […]
we must work to make our nation safer, more prosperous...” (RA 25.1.2003).
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3.10.2. Equating freedom with security
“I will defend the freedom and security of the American people.” (SoUA
2003)
Freedom and its synonym liberty are two terms which often find themselves
associated to security. Interestingly, one of the most widespread criticisms raised
against policies of the Bush administration has been that the latter has come at the
price of the former. But their close and recurrent association in speech could be a way
of linking both concepts as interdependent instead of as conflicting: “the cause of
freedom and security is worth our struggle” (RA 10.4.2004); “the price of freedom and
security is high” (SoUA 2002).
In the same way, freedom appears as the opposite of fear, which is in turn the
opposite of security. This is, in purely logical terms, quite normal, but it becomes odd
when one remembers that in the United States fear has recently been used precisely to
limit liberties:
“In this struggle of freedom against fear...” (RA 20.10.2001); “freedom is the
answer to hopelessness and terror” (RA 15.5.2004).
In any case, freedom and liberty seem to be sometimes used for their mantra-like
effect: sprinkled liberally on the discourse to give it a positive flavour: “The attack on
freedom in our world has reaffirmed our confidence in freedom’s power to change the
world. We are all part of a great venture: To extend the promise of freedom in our
country, to renew the values that sustain our liberty, and to spread the peace that
freedom brings” (SoUA 2005).
3.11. References to history
“America has stood down enemies before...” (OO 11.9)
The need of the United States to build an historical past and to refer to it might well
have become a cliché, it is however a reality. President Bush’s addresses also show this
feature. He places historical flashbacks throughout his speeches with a view to
instilling into his audiences a sense of pride and of certitude, and so legitimize his own
policies. Pride in the nation’s former feats, and by analogy in the present ones.
Certitude in a victorious outcome of the war. This is why historical referents must be
unequivocally perceived in a positive light; controversial episodes like the Vietnam
War or even the first Iraq War never come up.
A frequent theme of historical support are previous wars. The favorite example is,
of course, World War II. First, the episode provoking America’s involvement, the
attack of Pearl Harbour in December 1941: “In the space of only 102 minutes, our
country lost more citizens than were lost in the attack on Pearl Harbor” (RA
11.9.2004). More generally, the most positive aspects of that war: “America has made
and kept this kind of commitment before–in the peace that followed World War II”
(RA 1.3.2003); “America has no truer friend than Great Britain. Once again, we are
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joined together in a great cause” (JSC 20.9); “The World War II Memorial will stand
forever as a tribute to the generation that fought that war […] Today, freedom faces
new enemies” (RA 29.5.2004). Another victorious war, the Cold War, gets a mention
likewise: “During his presidency, Harry Truman recognized that our nation’s
fragmented defenses had to be reorganized to win the Cold War” (RA 8.6.2002).
References to the founding fathers also come up, in this case with an explicit
parallelism with the present situation: “Our country’s founding generation established
liberty and justice on this continent more than two centuries ago […] Our duty as
Americans is to serve our country, to defend the cause of liberty, and to extend the
realm of freedom across the earth” (RA 14.6.2003).
And finally, a quote that combines a reference to the creator of the national anthem
with another symbol of American feats in World War II, and explicitly the attacks on
the Twin Towers: “When Francis Scott Key saw the Stars and Stripes flying over Fort
McHenry in 1814, he knew that liberty would persevere. That same faith was affirmed
by Marines who planted the flag at Iwo Jima, and by the heroes of 9/11, who raised
and saluted the flag at Ground Zero” (RA 14.6.2003). In this way, Bush turns
September 11th into one of the great patriotic occasions in the history of the country.
4. Implications of political discourse as justifying actual policies
Political speech, by definition, is never gratuitous. Messages, be they open or
hidden, are always issued with some purpose in mind. Therefore, they often have a
reflexion in reality that it merits examination. In part III we have analyzed official
political discourse in the United States after September 11th, as conveyed by President
Bush. We have seen it organized around the war/terror semantic axis, and we have
determined the main themes deriving from it. In the present part, we intend to ascertain
the connexion between discourse and policy, that is to say, how certain policy measures
of the Bush administration have been based on official discourse or, to put it differently,
in what way such discourse has served to justify concrete policy decisions.
4.1. Ultimate political design and concrete policies
The events of September 11th have had far-reaching repercussions in the United
States, in domestic as well as in foreign policy. The undeniable general rallying around
President Bush and in support of his administration’s policies, however, has not
completely silenced critical voices or assuaged misgivings over such policies. Some
commentators have attempted to look behind the political façade and bring to light
underlying motives and objectives. Amongst the most vocal and articulate critics,
economist Paul Krugman and billionaire philanthropist George Soros stand out for
their sharp and thought-out alternative view of things. This view is largelly born out
by the texts we have analyzed. Nevertheless, some nuances and qualifications are also
possible, and this will be the object of section IV.2.
When he first took office on January 20th, 2001, George W. Bush put forward in his
inaugural address his vision for American foreign policy. This was almost eight
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months before the attack on the World Trade Center, but his statement was already
perfectly relevant for what was to come:
“We will build our defenses beyond challenge, lest weakness invite
challenge. We will confront weapons of mass destruction, so that a new century
is spared new horrors. The enemies of liberty and our country should make no
mistake: America remains engaged in the world by history and by choice,
shaping a balance of power that favors freedom. We will defend our allies and
our interests. We will show purpose without arrogance. We will meet
aggression and bad faith with resolve and strength. And to all nations, we will
speak for the values that gave our nation birth.” (IA 2001)
This vision was but a rather literary expression of principles expounded in a 1997
document by the neoconservative think tank Project for the New American Century
(Statement of Principles, June 3, 1997). These principles can be summed up as
follows:
“International relations are relations of power, not law; power prevails and
law legitimizes what prevails […]. The United States is unquestionably the
dominant power in the post-Cold War world; it is therefore in a position to
impose its views, interests and values on the world. The world would benefit
from adopting American values because the American model has demonstrated
its superiority […]. The United States must assert its supremacy in the world.”
(SOROS, 2004: 3-4)
There seems, then, to have been a previous political agenda that only came to
fruition in the wake of September 11th. As a matter of fact, neoconservative calls for
intervention in Iraq go back as far as 1992, when Paul Wolfowitz had argued for it and
for preemptive attacks abroad (see KRUGMAN, 2004: 10). In 1998, likewise, some
participants in the Project sent an open letter to President Clinton with the same
argument on Iraq (see SOROS, 2004: 25). In this context, later claims about Saddam
Hussein’s possesion of weapons of mass destruction and about his alleged connexion
to terrorist groups can be explained as attempts to make an Iraq war fit in with the
declared overall war on terror. In the light of this hypothesis, many other actions and
policies of the Bush administration become more understandable.
The declared state of war was not only a political end of the neoconservatives. It
also happened to be a useful means to achieve other ends of their agenda. War gave
President Bush the popular mandate he lacked at first because of the controversial way
his electoral contest against Al Gore had been decided on. His personal popularity
soared. As wartime Commander-in-Chief, he was endowed with a new legitimacy and
came to be regarded as “a tough-minded hero, all determination and moral clarity”
(KRUGMAN, 2004: xxxix).
Responding to the September 11th attacks involved a fundamental policy shift,
namely from law-enforcement to military measures as a response to terrorism:
“The United States has shifted its conception of terrorism as a “crime” to
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terrorism as an “act of war.” In the past, the United States classified
international terrorism as a crime and applied legal means as the primary tool
to fight it. More recently, however, the United States has moved away from
reactive counter-terrorism law enforcement methods towards more proactive
techniques to fight international terrorism.” (TIEFENBRUN, 2003: 367)
We have already seen (§ 3.3.2) some aspects relating to this choice. Although the
Bush administration did take action in both fields, as the Patriot Act and the Homeland
Security Act clearly show, when it came to the federal budget, a clear imbalance
becomes apparent. Homeland security spending followed the general pattern of
restrictive budget policies, with billions of dollars actually getting blocked just as
defence spending kept increasing considerably. Besides controversy about the
effectiveness of this approach, this has given rise to allegations of neglect and to
misgivings as to the real motives behind the Iraq invasion:
“Treating the attacks of September 11 as crimes against humanity would have
been more appropriate. Crimes require police work, not military action. To
protect against terrorism, you need precautionary measures, awareness, and
intelligence gathering […]. Imagine for a moment that September 11 had been
treated as a crime. We would have pursued Bin Laden in Afghanistan, but we
would not have invaded Iraq.” (SOROS, 2004: 18)
“there are solid military reasons why modern regular forces are all but useless
for fighting what is fast becoming the dominant form of war [low-intensity
wars] in our age.” (VAN CREVELD, 1991: 29)
War was possible because an enemy was found. We have seen (§ 3.3.4) how
important an adversary is for building political discourse. Yet, whereas in the case of
electoral campaigns the adversary is the political opponent from another party, which
only serves to rally one’s own supporters. An enemy, on the other hand, serves in
wartime to rally the minds and wills of the whole nation, since then the adversary is
common. It is also a stranger, coming from beyond the borders to threaten our way of
life, an outsider not deserving regard or fairness, or due process as would a criminal.
After World War II, the official enemy for the United States had been communism.
Many policy decisions had been based on this fundamental antagonism, amongst
others the McCarthyist Witch Hunt in the 1950s and the Vietnam War. With the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of communism, this traditional enemy of
recent times disappeared. Terrorism came to take on that role. But, since individual
terrorists or terrorist groups could not justify attacks against sovereign states, the war
on terror was declared to encompass terrorism-supporting states. Some of them were
particularly targeted as members of the axis of evil. This targeting of individual states
was, according to Daniel INNERARITY (2004: 72 ff), a way of reframing an elusive
situation as a recognizable one, namely a conventional war with a traditional enemy
that could be attacked with a regular army.
The existence of an enemy in times of war makes simplifications easier and serves
to polarize the situation, as we have seen (§ 3.3.4 and 3.3.7). Simplification is, in turn,
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fundamental in achieving polarization. The analyzed addresses are, in fact, extremely
simplistic19. They are constructed along Manichean schemes and a few very basic,
primary ideas, avoiding complex argument or nuancing. They resort to constant
repetition of the key words, which become mantras sticking easily to the mind of the
audience. The result is a sustained escape from the inherent complexity of the subject
and, therefore, from any rational questioning, thus hindering debate and criticism.
Instilling fear in a population is by definition the main goal of terrorism. In that
sense, the September 11th attacks were fully successful. We will see later (§ 4.2) that
this was not a difficult task. But the fact is, in any case, that fear was the defining
emotion in the American population at the time, it has continued to be so to a large
extent and has determined the reaction to events both by the population and by its
leaders. We have seen (§ 3.9 and 3.10) how references to danger and the need for
security abound in President Bush’s public addresses. These mentions are usually not
reassuring but rather alarmist, even apocalyptic, highlighting unknown threats and
insidious dangers that put the survival of the country at risk.
“The loss of three thousand innocent lives is an enormous human tragedy, but
it does not endanger our existence as a nation. To elevate the threat posed by al
Qaeda to the level represented by nuclear war is a wild exaggeration that can
be sustained only by cultivating a link between terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction.” (SOROS, 2004: 28)
To many, these frightening messages were overstatements intended to create a sense
of emergency that would act as a spur to unity through the suspension of public scrutiny
and criticism: “Those of us who have lived through these challenging times have been
changed by them. We’ve come to know truths that we will never question: evil is real,
and it must be opposed” (SoUA 2002). For instance, enactment by Congress of a major
piece of law enforcement legislation, the controversial PATRIOT Act, took place on
October 25th, 2001, precisely in the midst of the anthrax scare in Washington. The huge
majority20 supporting the Act has subsequently been atributed to “emotional voting”
(HAMM, 2003: 10), and the Act itself has been widely criticized. Another instance of this
“institutionalization of the politics of fear” is the announcement of Jose Padilla’s arrest
and his alleged plot to explode a dirty bomb (the Justice Department later had to retract
from its overplayed representation of facts (HAMM, 2003: 27).
Polarization combines with the state of fear and with calls for unity resulting in the
checking of dissent. Even if patriotism is not often explicitly referred to (see § 3.3.6),
opposing government policy or criticizing political leaders in wartime is considered to
be unpatriotic. Nuancing and questioning become difficult when public opinion is
confronted with a life-or-death crisis:
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“The war on terror polarizes the world between us and them. If it becomes a
matter of survival, nobody has any choice but to stick with his own tribe or
nation whether its policies are right or wrong.” (SOROS, 2004: xi)
“Opposing restrictions on civil rights and liberties amounts to becoming an
ally to the enemy.” (CASALS, 2002: 147)
And so, once al Qaeda had accomplished the aim by definition of a terrorist act,
instilling terror in the population, the Bush administration played on that fear,
exaggerated the danger confronting the nation and so provoked a lasting sense of
emergency. The new situation was akin to an indefinite state of exception, whereby
President Bush, as the leader of a country at war, “wrapped himself in the flag”
(KRUGMAN) and got what amounted to a blank check for policy making. In this way,
measures that in normal times would have stirred dissent, went almost unopposed, as
they were considered a lesser evil in comparison with the evil of terrorism:
“On TV this looks like World War II […] And the home front looks not like
wartime but like a postwar aftermath, in which the normal instincts of a nation
at war –to rally round the flag and place trust in our leaders– are too easily
exploited […] What this country needs is a return to normalcy” (KRUGMAN,
2004: 250, 25.11.2001)
The Bush administration could then proceed, unchecked, to implement a far-
reaching domestic and foreign policy agenda. One of the most notorious aspects of the
domestic side was the USA PATRIOT Act (the title was already clearly meant to
dissuade criticism):
“The Patriot Act confers unprecedented powers on the executive branch and
removes many of the constrains imposed by judicial processes. Taken together
with its companion piece, the Homeland Security Act, it limits public access to
government information while at the same time promoting government access
to sensitive personal information and sharing that information among federal,
state, and local authorities. Although the legislation seriously infringes civil
liberties, it aroused little concern in the public because most of the legislation’s
provisions are assumed to be directed against them, terrorists and foreigners,
rather than us, innocent civilians” (SOROS, 2004: 37)
This curtailment of civil rights combines with another aspect, the blurring of
semantic distinctions between war and terrorism, to result in legal anomalies and
limbos like the Guantanamo Bay case. In this context, the relevance of definitions
becomes clear (see § 2.2.2). One of the criticisms the PATRIOT Act has received is the
“breathtakingly vague and broad definition of terrorism and of aiding terrorists”
(DWORKIN, 2002). As we have mentioned, definitions are fundamental in law-making.
The broader the definition, the more inclusive the defined term can be, leaving too
much discretionary power to the law enforcers:
“This language stretches the meaning of the word “war.” If Washington
means “war” metaphorically, as when it speaks about a “war” on drugs, the
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rhetoric would be uncontroversial, a mere hortatory device intended to rally
support for an important cause. Bush, however, seems to think of the war on
terrorism quite literally –as a real war– and this concept has worrisome
implications. The rules that bind governments are much looser during wartime
than in times of peace. The Bush administration has used war rhetoric precisely
to give itself the extraordinary powers enjoyed by a wartime government to
detain or even kill suspects without trial. In the process, the administration may
have made it easier for itself to detain or eliminate suspects. But it has also
threatened the most basic due process rights.” (ROTH, 2004)
“In the United States there is a general confusion about what constitutes
terrorism […] The absence of a generally-accepted definition of terrorism in the
United States allows the government to craft variant or vague definitions which
can result in an erosion of civil rights and the possible abuse of power by the
state in the name of fighting terrorism and protecting national security.”
(TIEFENBRUN, 2003: 367)
Thus, the Guantanamo prisoners are considered enemy combatants regardless of
whether they have taken active part in hostilities, which (according to the Geneva
Conventions) would warrant their detention until the end of the conflict.
The declared state of war, as we have seen (§ 3.8) was not accompanied by clear
statements about the war’s duration or aims. War was thus presented as an open-ended
situation about which the most that could be said was that it would be long. This
ambiguity prevented any kind of assessment as to the progress of operations or the
balance between achievements and resources invested. In the meantime, exceptional
policies seemed to become long-term ones:
“Key provisions of the Patriot Act are set to expire next year. The terrorist
threat will not expire on that schedule.” (SoUA 2004)
“But if this is war, it bears little resemblance to the wars America has won in
the past […] How will we know when or if we’ve won? […] There will never
be a day when we can declare terrorism stamped out for good. It will be more
like fighting crime, where success is always relative and victory is never final,
than like fighting a war. And the metaphor we use to describe our struggle
matters: some things that are justifiable in a temporary time of war are not
justifiable during a permanent fight against crime, even if the criminals are
murderous fanatics […]. We’re in this for the long haul, so any measures we
take to fight terrorism had better be measures that we are prepared to live with
indefinitely. The real challenge now is not to stamp out terrorism; that’s an
unattainable goal. The challenge is to find a way to cope with the threat of
terrorism without losing the freedom and prosperity that make America the
great nation it is.” (KRUGMAN, 2004: 239)
In the general confusion brought about by gripping fear, some key aspects of the
domestic neoconservative agenda were also put into practice without serious
opposition. Defense spending rose dramatically, which seemed only logical in a war
situation. But this was an exception in a general and avowed agenda to reduce federal
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spending and the role of government overall:
“At a time when we’re at war, at a time when we need to strengthen our
economy, Congress must control wasteful spending while funding the nation’s
priorities.” (RA 9.11.2002)
“the spirit of the times was definitely against anything that looked like an
increase in government spending, unless it was explicitly military.” (KRUGMAN,
2004: 230)
Calls for general budgetary discipline were justified as a way to deal with the
growing federal deficit, which was itself the result, amongst other things, of a recession
that had officially begun in March 2001. Employment was rising and the stock market
was in crisis. Nevertheless, neither the deficit nor the uncertainties of a war situation
prevented the Bush administration from implementing a long-term, regressive fiscal
rebate of large proportions while denying its influence in the overall deficit:
“when it comes to tax cuts and military spending, the Bush administration’s
budget is an exercise in unrestrained self-indulgence. There is a lot of stirring
rhetoric, warning the nation that this is a time of war, in which everyone must
make sacrifices […] while there is much talk of hard choices, the
administration seems loath to make any choices at all when it comes to defense
spending.” (KRUGMAN, 2004: 239)
Some commentators did even suggest, through 2002, that a war would help
economic recovery, starting a debate in the media: “if the economy needs a burst of
federal spending, neither economics nor politics requires that this burst take the form
of a war” (KRUGMAN, 2004: 88-89). Moreover, the United States’ dependence on
foreign oil supplies was widely recognized as a hindrance for the country, “perhaps the
single most important impediment to America’s control of its own destiny” (SOROS,
2004: 52). President Bush did not mention oil specifically, but rather “America’s
energy independence”, or “our dependence on foreign energy sources”. In this
connexion, two claims have been made. One, that invading Iraq had something to do
with ensuring oil imports. And two, that the attacks had served to justify some
controversial domestic energy measures:
“Since Sept. 11 there has also been a sustained effort, under cover of the
national emergency, to open public lands to oil companies and logging
interests. Administration officials claim that it’s all for the sake of national
security.” (KRUGMAN, 2004: 249)
What is undeniable is that war actually functioned as a smoke screen, distracting
public attention from an economic slowdown, rising unemployment, a spate of
financial scandals, fiscal policies etc.
4.2. A conducive environment for the implementation of a pre-set agenda
The course of events in United States domestic and foreign policy after the events
of September 11th was not only the result of the political will of the Bush
administration but, to some extent, it was also facilitated by a number of circumstances
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we will now comment upon. This is in order to avoid as much as possible falling into
oversimplification, while recognizing the intrinsic complexity of the situation.
4.2.1. A society of fear
“Cultures differ by what they fear, and they change when their fears change”
(INNERARITY, 2004: 147)
While it is a fact that the attack on the World Trade Center was primarily intended
to intimidate the American people and government, and while there are signs that the
Bush administration played on the resulting fears in order to further its political
agenda, there are other circumstances that cannot be ignored. “The terrorists seem to
have hit upon a weak point in our collective psyche. They have made us fearful”
(SOROS, 2004: xi). In his book La sociedad invisible (The Invisible Society), Spanish
philosopher Daniel INNERARITY says obsession with security -and the attendant fear
caused by insecurity– is one of the defining features of modern societies:
“Nowadays, risk has taken the place formerly attributed to the production of
material goods […]. Class societies were interested in equality; risk societies
strive after security […] Passions formerly oriented to changing the world are
invested today in securing what we have” […] “in contemporary society “in
contemporary society […] caution has become institutionalized so that it can
cover every aspect of life to an unprecedented extent” caution has become
institutionalized so that it can cover every aspect of life to an unprecedented
extent” (INNERARITY, 2004: 153 and 169) 
And this intrinsic social fear is in direct proportion to the power a given society seems
to have: “There is a kind of fear that arises the more powerful the society, that is to say, the
more final its victory over fear seems to be” (INNERARITY, 2004: 148). There is little
wonder, then, that the most powerful society in the world seems also the most frightened…
In this situation, the traditional provider of security, the state, is left powerless:
“Amongst all possible demands, it is the one concerning security that gives
public authorities the most headaches […] It has been a while since threats and
security stopped being territorial issues. And the states, which are basically
subject to territorial imperatives, no longer know what to do […] the demand
for security is addressed to states at a time in which they see their powers
diminish...” (INNERARITY, 2004: 168)
Governments, then, are tempted to magnify risks in order to escape accountability:
“Overmagnifying the terrorist threat has served several purposes […] It has
contributed to governments blurring away their responsibilities; it has
prevented its handling according to a logic the effectiveness of which could be
assessed. And, one of its most worrisome aspects is the fact that distinction
between normalcy and exception has become so confused, that exceptional
risks have empowered governments to introduce too many exceptions,
something harming democratic normalcy.” (INNERARITY, 2004: 97)
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4.2.2. Unilateralism as a continued trend
Nobody would underestimate the shock of the attack on the Twin Towers for the
American people. It seems also true that the Bush administration has overplayed those
events in order to justify some of its policies, as if September the 11th had opened a
chasm in the flow of history and nothing could ever be as before. However, some
scholars have qualified this view, arguing that, after all, September 11th did not
fundamentally change US foreign policy or the world situation, as much as settled
them on a previously established course. In this sense, therefore, the policies of the
Bush administration have to be put into perspective, even when they did involve an
acceleration of that trend:
“The 1990s saw, in the final analysis, America’s confident self-affirmation on
the world scene, once it had rid itself of the uncomfortable Soviet rival. Nobody
could counterbalance its power any more. Americans came thus to the
conclusion that they could not consider themselves as an ordinary member of
the international community […] Unilateralism was not born with the Iraq war,
or with September 11th, not even with George W. Bush’s election. It had been
growing throughout the 1990s. It is under Clinton’s presidency that the United
States kept away from major multilateral treaties […] Both Bush’s election and
September 11th just speeded up American unilateralism, but they did not create
it out of the blue.” (BONIFACE, 2005: 20-1)
This is in sharp contrast with public opinion perceptions, as shown in the regular
surveys by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. Comparing the 1999 and the
2002 editions shows terrorism as becoming the biggest problem for the country; public
support for an active role in the world for the United States is a stable factor;
nevertheless, unilateral action remains contested in both cases, even in connexion with
the war against terrorism. Working together with other countries is instead seen as a
better course of action, including taking part in multilateral treaties. This public mood
of “guarded engagement”21 means that the United States leadership had to make a
tremendous effort of public relations in order to make its case before the public and
thereby win it over to its more interventionist policies. The results of the 2004 election
are clear proof of this attempt’s succes.
4.2.3. “Decades of escalating violence”
“In one way, that assault was the culmination of decades of escalating
violence–from the killing of U.S. Marines in Beirut, to the bombing at the
World Trade Center, to the attacks on American embassies in Africa, to the
attacks on the USS Cole.” (NDU 2005)
This quote by President Bush by no means reflects a purely personal view of
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things. Long before the attacks on the World Trade Center, in his 1996 book The Clash
of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Samuel Huntington was talking
about a latent dynamics, a quasi war between Islam and the West, going back to the
1979 Iranian Revolution. This hypothesis could easily be taken as a justification for
both the attacks and for the war on terrorism. Both actions would thus be framed in an
ongoing global trend:
“Both sides have, moreover, recognized this conflict to be a war. Early on,
Khomeini declared, quite accurately, that “Iran is effectively at war with
America,” and Qadhafi regularly proclaims holy war against the West. Muslim
leaders of other extremist groups and states have spoken in similar terms. On
the Western side, the United States has classified seven countries as “terrorist
states,” five of which are Muslim […]. This, in effect, identifies them as
enemies […], and thus recognizes the existence of a state of war with them.
U.S. officials repeatedly refer to these states as “outlaw,” “backlash,” and
“rogue” states-thereby placing them outside the civilized international order
and making them legitimate targets for multilateral or unilateral
countermeasures. The United States Government charged the World Trade
Center bombers with intending “to levy a war of urban terrorism against the
United States” and argued that conspirators charged with planning further
bombings in Manhattan were “soldiers” in a struggle “involving a war”
against the United States. If Muslims allege that the West wars on Islam and if
Westerners allege that Islamic groups war on the West, it seems reasonable to
conclude that something very much like a war is underway. […] the participants
in this war employ much more violent tactics against each other than the United
States and Soviet Union directly employed against each other in the Cold War.”
(HUNTINGTON, 1996: 216-7)
The National Security Strategy (2002) also refers explicitly to the clash. The fact
that it does so to deny its validity does not show any less that it is a conceptual referent
policy makers in the United States were keeping in mind:
“The war on terrorism is not a clash of civilizations. It does, however, reveal
the clash inside a civilization, a battle for the future of the Muslim world.”
(NSS 2002)
4.2.4. A growing conceptual confusion
In part II we have tried to analyze a number of definitional problems related to the
terms war and terrorism. We have later seen how the interplay of these two
overlapping concepts has been used in political discourse, as well as some practical
policy problems resulting from it. In this sense, the use that has been made in the
United States of both terms in an axis articulating political discourse was to some
extent facilitated by a growing conceptual confusion predating September 11th but
accentuated by the events of that day. Daniel INNERARITY sums it up:
“Terrorism deconstructs not only the distinction between civil and military,
but also the distinction between victory and defeat, even between the victorious
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and the defeated (the clearest example of this can be seen in the fact that it was
never known when the Iraq war had finished and which side had won, as well
as the fact that most casualties happened once the war seemed to have ended).
Terrorism ignores limits and has also blurred distinctions that were hallmarks
of our culture: that between barbarism beyond certain borders and civilization
within those borders; that between soldiers and policemen on the one hand, and
criminals on the other […]. And finally, the distinction the loss of which causes
us the most puzzlement is the one that used to distinguish peace and war, and
that today has been replaced by a general situation of indeterminate threat”
(INNERARITY, 2004: 74)
In the final analysis, however, despite all these contributing or facilitating factors,
the fact remains that the war on terror and its associated policies were a political
choice, not an unavoidable course of action:
“Even so, September 11, 2001, could not have changed the course of history
to the extent that it has if President Bush had not responded to it the way he did”
(SOROS, 2004: 3)
Samuel HUNTINGTON himself did recognize that the response to date to violent acts
from the opposite side had been quite moderate, implying it could also be otherwise:
“To date, each side has, apart from the Gulf War, kept the intensity of the
violence at reasonably low levels and refrained from labeling violent acts as
acts of war requiring an all-out response.” (HUNTINGTON, 1996: 216-7)
So, in the end, what the Bush administration chose to do was to break this trend of
self-restraint and transform the ongoing quasi war into a full-blown war. Whereas the
destruction of the Twin Towers was an act independent from its will, its response to it
did involve a deliberate strategic and policy choice, thus taking Huntington’s thesis of
the clash to its logical consequences22.
5. Conclusion
The terrorist attacks that took place on September 11th, 2001 in the United States
caused widespread shock and fear, as well as social trauma in the population. The
reactions of the leaders, as expressed in concrete policies, have had a huge impact on
the subsequent course of events in the rest of the world.
In the present work, we have attempted to examine the connexion between these
policy reactions and the official discourse that has served to communicate them to the
public at large. We have found that official discourse in the United States after
September 11th has revolved mainly around a semantic axis built around the concepts
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of war and terrorism.
After some introductory and methodological remarks in part I, we have analyzed
in part II some conceptual problems related to the definition of war and, especially, of
terrorism. We have found a semantic overlap between the two and we have
commented on the resulting interplay and associated definitional problems, including
efforts at finding a universal definition of terrorism and an outline of the main
semantic features such definition should contain.
In part III, we have examined a corpus of relevant texts as a sample of United States
official discourse from 2001 to 2005. By analyzing the semantic and structural
makeup of such texts, we have found a series of recurrent themes focused on the ideas
of the attack against the United States and the response to it, the whole discourse being
aimed mainly at persuading public opinion of the need to close ranks and rally behind
the leaders and their policies.
In part IV, finally, we have argued that a link exists between formal discourse and
the political reality behind it. We have seen how actual attitudes and policies echo
speech themes. The Bush administration seems to have taken the situation arising from
the September 11th attacks as an oportunity to implement a far-reaching domestic and
foreign policy agenda. In so doing, it has attracted widespread criticism, particularly
over the resulting erosion of civil rights. However, we also take account of a series of
underlying contributing factors which are independent from the will and actions of the
political elite.
The main conclusion we have reached is the existence of a growing confusion
between the concepts of war and terrorism, arising mainly from the ongoing process
of globalization, and the fact that this confusion can be very easily used to overlook
well-established legal frameworks like civil rights and public accountability.
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